Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of William C. Westmoreland

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, William C. Westmoreland, of Charleston, South Carolina, do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of a personal interview conducted on February 8, 1969 at Washington, D.C. and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. The transcript shall be available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

2. The tape recording of the interview shall also be available for research use under the same conditions governing the transcript. If the interviewee has made substantive changes in the transcript, however, the reference copy of the tape shall be modified to conform to the edited version before the recording can be made available to researchers.

3. I hereby assign to the United States Government all literary property rights I may have in the interview transcript and tape.

4. Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

5. Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

[Signature]
Donor
9 April 1977

[Signature]
Archivist of the United States
April 27, 1977
INTERVIEW I
DATE: February 8, 1969
INTERVIEWEE: GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND
INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE MCSWEENY
PLACE: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

DM: General Westmoreland, before I even really get into any questions, as a matter of introducing our discussion, I'd like to sort of pinpoint the more recent dates of your appointments. I think that your career is very well known, and your record is I think easy to identify and document, so I won't go into any more than just the most recent appointments. You were nominated and confirmed for Chief of Staff of the Army in June of 1968. From January 1964 to 1968, you were commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam and Commanding General of the U.S. Army, Vietnam. From 1960 to 1963 you were Superintendent of West Point. Do I have the correct dates on these?

WW: With one exception. I was nominated to be Chief of Staff of the United States Army in March 1968. I was confirmed in June. I took office and was sworn in on the third of July, 1968. Previous to that, for four-and-a-half years, I was in South Vietnam. For approximately five months I served in a deputy capacity to General Paul Harkins. Then for the next approximate four years I served as Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. So you're essentially correct with those changes.

DM: General Westmoreland, have you ever taped an interview for any other oral history project?
DM: My reason for asking this is that we would skip any areas you had covered and not duplicate things.

I'd like to begin this with a very general question and ask you when you recall your first meeting with Lyndon Johnson.

WW: I first met Mr. Johnson when he was Vice President. This was in 1961 in June of that year when he came to West Point to make the graduation address at West Point, at which time he was, of course, Vice President of the United States, with President Kennedy being President at the time. I spent most of the day with him. I met him at Stewart Air Force Base, which is near Newburgh, New York, in the morning. He addressed the graduation ceremonies late that morning. He had lunch with us in my quarters, as a matter of fact in the garden outside my quarters proper, at West Point and then departed in mid-afternoon. Riding in the automobile from Stewart Air Base to West Point and back, and during the course of luncheon and other activities that we staged for him, I had considerable opportunity to talk to him and to make his acquaintance.

That was our initial meeting, and I do not believe that I saw him or talked to him thereafter until we met in Honolulu in early February 1966 during which time the President was considering one of the major decisions that he had to make during the course of his Presidency, namely, whether sizeable U.S. forces would be committed in South Vietnam.

DM: In your first meeting, do you recall any particular impressions or conversations that you had?

WW: We talked mostly about West Point, about the young men about to be graduated, about the ideals of West Point, particularly the ideal of
service to the country. He interrogated me at some length as to where I was from and questioned me about my background. I found him a very warm personable individual and instinctively liked him.

Other than that, there was nothing particularly substantive discussed except I remember, riding in the automobile from Stewart Air Force Base to West Point, he stated that he had looked over the speech that he had planned to give to the graduating class of 1961. He was not particularly pleased with it, and he thought he would throw his manuscript away and talk from the heart. He asked my advice in that regard, and my answer to him was that I was confident that if he talked from the heart it would be a very effective address. Although I had not seen the address that had been prepared for him, I was confident he would not go wrong in "talking from the heart." This was rather interesting because the President, during my close association with him during the course of the conflict in Vietnam, frequently made known his views, his ideas, or his intentions to get my advice, or as a minimum, to gain my reaction. I would say that at our first meeting--the first five minutes of our meeting--he did seek my advice on this rather minor point.

DM: General Westmoreland, when were you first contacted regarding your assignment to Vietnam?

WW: This was in December of 1963 when I received a telephone call one evening from General Wheeler, who at that time occupied this office and the position that I now hold as Chief of Staff of the Army. He asked if I might fly up to Washington to see him the next day. I agreed, of course, to do so. I had an intuitive impression as to what he wanted to see me about. During the entire time that I was Superintendent at West Point I had the conviction that I would eventually end up in Vietnam.
DM: Why do you say that?

WW: Primarily because I was interested and somewhat aspired to this assignment. But I never made this point known to anyone—not even to my wife, needless to say, whom I think would have been less than enthusiastic about it. But, obviously, that was the arena of challenge, and I've been one to seek challenges.

So when I was called by General Wheeler on the telephone, I was rather sure in my own mind of what he was going to tell me. I confided this to my wife. And as I walked into his office and he was sitting at this desk, after an exchange of pleasantries—he being an old personal friend—his first question was: "Have you heard that you're going to Vietnam?" I said, "No, not until now, but it doesn't surprise me very much."

He then proceeded to give me the details as to when they wanted me to report, which was in January. We talked about who would replace me as Commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

I had no contact with the Commander in Chief—the President—prior to my leaving to go to Vietnam. My assignment, as described by General Wheeler and announced to the press, was that I was to be deputy to General Harkins. However, without definitely saying so, General Wheeler relayed to me the impression, which was quite clear, that I was being sent eventually to take over the command. He was not at liberty to precisely tell me that, but the context within which he informed me of my assignment and the details of it led me to that definite conclusion. And, of course, I arrived in South Vietnam in late January of '64.

Then in June of that year, of course, I took over command.
DM: General Westmoreland, this is kind of an odd question, but have you since found out how you happened to be the one that they chose in this capacity?

WW: The President has talked to me about this on a number of occasions, as a matter of fact, as we have informally talked and reminisced. The President, of course, is a very relaxed conversationalist. Usually when I returned from Vietnam to Washington, he asked me to be his house guest. It was always my privilege and honor to stay at the White House. Of course, under those circumstances, I saw him frequently. As a matter of fact, he took me into the family; and I was made to feel completely at home and occasionally had breakfast with him at his bedside, at one time we talked until the late hours in the evening. He would call me during the course of the day and say, "Stop down and let's talk."

He told me that there were several officers that were considered for this position and that, after considerable discussion with Secretary McNamara and others, I was selected to go to Vietnam to prepare to take over the command from General Harkins who was nearing age sixty which is our age of retirement. So it was in anticipation of General Harkins' retirement that I was sent out.

Now the situation is so complex in Vietnam, it's desirable that whoever has the responsibility have an opportunity to get oriented in the environment. I think it was a very wise thing to allow me approximately five months to get acquainted with the countryside and the senior officials. The same policy, of course, was adopted when General Abrams was sent over. However, General Abrams had the opportunity for understudying me for over a year—which again, in my opinion, was a wise policy.
DM: Did the President ever tell you what his reasons were for accepting you?

WW: He told me on a number of occasions [that] when he first met me at West Point, he concluded that "I was his type of man." Now he did not describe or define his type of man, but he presumably thought that I fell in that category.

DM: Over the course of your four-year tour in Vietnam, can you estimate how many times you actually met with the President in coming back and forth for the briefings and for meetings?

WW: I met him in Honolulu, and this was on the eve of the big decision to commit ground forces. We had committed some air forces and some air defense forces before that, mostly HAWK battalions specifically.

I then met him at Manila on the occasion of the Manila Conference. Following Manila he came to Cam Ranh Bay and visited the troops. Of course, I was his host on that occasion.

Then in April 1967 he asked me to return to the United States to accept an invitation extended by the Associated Press. After I had talked to the annual meeting of the Associated Press in the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City, I was invited by the Congress of the United States to address a Joint Session, which I subsequently did.

I was a guest in the White House on the occasion of my visit to Washington, excepting one evening which was my last evening, when I stayed with General and Mrs. Wheeler, since they had a dinner party for Mrs. Westmoreland and myself. This was the evening before I talked to the Joint Session of Congress, and I left that afternoon.

This was a very busy time. I had limited time to prepare my address before the Joint Session of Congress, which was a rather unique distinction.
And I recall after the dinner party at the Wheelers, which did not break up until after eleven o'clock, I went up to read over my manuscript for the last time and found it unsatisfactory. So I worked until about two o'clock in the morning in making major revisions. Fortunately, we had time the next morning to have it typed up.

The President again called me back in November of 1967, at which time Ambassador Bunker was also asked to return. The two of us appeared on a television show, "Meet the Press." I also talked to the National Press Club here in Washington. I again was guest of the President and Mrs. Johnson at the White House. Mrs. Westmoreland accompanied me on that trip. I picked her up in the Philippines on the way back. President and Mrs. Johnson were very gracious hosts to us on that occasion, as they always were. Mrs. Johnson told Mrs. Westmoreland that if she wanted to entertain guests to please invite them in, and encouraged that we have some of our good friends in for dinner, which we subsequently did.

I remember one evening after we had finished dinner, I was unable to join with Mrs. Westmoreland to have dinner with my guests because the President that evening had well over a hundred, approximately one hundred and fifty, Democratic Congressmen for dinner at the White House. The President asked me if I would join them for dinner, understanding that this was somewhat of an awkward request—which he admitted—but which I fully understood. So I had dinner with the President, sat on his right at a round table with other Congressmen. There were many round tables in the large banquet hall at the White House. After dinner was over, the President asked me if I would talk about Vietnam which I did, completely "off the cuff," which the President apparently appreciated.
Then I rejoined my guests about eleven o'clock that night, and before our guests departed, the President and the First Lady showed up and joined the party. This was to the great delight of old friends who had never had the privilege of meeting the President and the First Lady. Perfectly relaxed, the President and the First Lady sat down and chatted with us for quite some time. They were delightful and most gracious hosts and they accepted Mrs. Westmoreland and myself—and on this occasion, our daughter, who was attending Bradford Junior College in Massachusetts—just like we were members of the family.

That same year the President went to Australia to attend the funeral of the Prime Minister of Australia. On the way back from Australia, he first stopped in Thailand at an air base, I believe at Khorat. Then he flew over to Cam Ranh Bay and again visited the troops. I brought in a cross-section of the troops, a representation from the major units of the command, so that they could see the President, and asked him to award some high decorations for valor on the field of battle, which he did. Those honored represented all Services—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps. This was in December of 1967.

I again came back in April of 1968. I conferred with the President and members of the National Security Council on some policy matters and was again guest at the White House. It was on that occasion that the President discussed with me in some detail when he had decided to make me Chief of Staff, which he had done in January of 1967. He said he had considered me for other assignments, but, based on Mr. McNamara's recommendation, he wanted me to be the next Chief of Staff.

Now I might go back to the visit to Washington and to the White House in November of 1967. Late one evening—it was around eleven
Westmoreland--1--9

o'clock, as I recall--we were sitting in the family living room, just the two of us, chatting. On that occasion he told me Mr. McNamara was leaving, but not what Mr. McNamara's job was going to be. He told me who he was going to appoint Mr. Clark Clifford as Secretary of Defense. He further, on that occasion, told me that he had decided not to run for reelection.

DM: This is November of 1967?

WW: 1967. He impressed upon me that this was information that he, had revealed to very few but fully understood that I would keep his confidence, which I did. I revealed this information to no one until the President himself had made known that he had discussed this matter with me after his speech in late March [31] of 1968--at which time he made this known.

DM: March 31st.

WW: March 31st. At which time he made it known, and I did confirm this. The President rationalized with me his decision. I believe that one of the reasons he brought it up to me was that he wanted specifically to know what the reaction of the troops in Vietnam would be. The President had a deep sense of responsibility for the welfare of the troops on the battlefield in Vietnam. He was always concerned about them. He did not want to take any step that would interfere with their morale or fighting effectiveness. My answer to him was that I thought if the matter was explained to them they would understand the President's point of view, the rationale for his decision, and that this would not have an adverse morale effect.

DM: What was your reaction? Were you surprised by this information regarding the Secretary of Defense and his not running?
WW: Well, of course, this is something that was completely unexpected. But the reasons for the President's actions--and Mr. McNamara's action to accept this other job--were quite understandable. They were not developments that I considered illogical in any way. So I wasn't surprised to the effect that I thought there was anything irregular about it. But I was highly complimented that the President would bring me into his confidence to the extent that he did.

DM: What did he tell you were his reasons for withdrawing from running again?

WW: The primary reason, as he discussed it with me, was his state of health. He had had a heart attack. He was tired. He had been carrying a terrible burden for a very long time. Mrs. Johnson, of course, had carried a burden almost comparable. He recalled other Presidents who had been semi-invalids while still President. And, of course, our Constitution does not relieve the President of the responsibility for leading the country and making the difficult decisions that are frequently necessary. In view of our many commitments around the earth--the pressure of these decisions, the necessity of timely decisions--he felt it was very important that the President be a man in a perfect state of health and that no chances be taken with respect to a deteriorating physical situation that could evolve.

DM: Did he discuss the political side of this with you?

WW: I don't recall that he made any reference to it, although he may have done so. Being a military man, I try to divorce myself from partisan political considerations. If he mentioned anything like this, I did not mentally record it because I was not politically oriented. As a professional officer and as commander of the troops in Vietnam, I serve the Commander in Chief without any partisan affiliations.
I've been very sensitive to this because after I came back and talked to the Joint Session of Congress in April 1967 and Vietnam became a partisan issue and I as a personality have personified our involvement in Vietnam, I was in a very delicate position. I had to walk a tightrope. My orientation was toward trying to pursue most effectively our military operations against the enemy in order to bring about ultimately a peaceful solution to the situation. I avoided getting involved in anything that would compromise my position as a professional officer. If I in any way made any statements, suggested any orientation that was partisan in nature and got involved in any of the political issues of the campaign, it would have been, in my opinion, contrary to the national interests.

So, although he may have brought something up in this regard, I cannot positively say he did or did not. Because of my orientation, this is not a matter that I was inclined to remember.

DM: General, there have been many things said regarding Mr. Johnson's very close contact with what was going on in Vietnam. Of course, part of this is due to our very highly developed and complex communications that we have now, that we have available to us now. What is your feeling about this as it developed in the situation in Vietnam--the President's almost instantaneous contact with you?

WW: There has been newspaper speculation and, as a matter of fact, statements in the newspapers that the President frequently talked to me in Vietnam over the telephone. This is incorrect. I did not talk to the President a single time over the telephone from Vietnam. He never called me. I never called him. I did my business through my military channels, and he received his information from the Pentagon.
Now frequently I would get messages from General Wheeler based on discussions with the President, or following meetings at the White House—that the President would like to have certain questions answered, and he was interested in some operation in particular. But never did I have direct telephonic communications with him.

Occasionally he would write me a letter primarily to congratulate me. It was the means of boosting my morale. Now there was never anything wrong with my morale, but I suppose after he read some of the newspaper comments, he probably assumed that my morale was not good. Particularly when Vietnam became a campaign issue, he would write me a letter of encouragement, which I considered a thoughtful act.

The President, of course, was involved in many policy decisions concerning the war. He did not want geographically to broaden the war. This was national policy. He adopted a policy of using our force with restraint. He was advised, I believe, of course in that regard. These restraints, of course, primarily involved what was referred to at that time as gradual escalation of the conflict—which involved in this regard perhaps the use of new weapons, such as the B-52's initially, riot control agents. All of these were new weapons in the conflict and there were restraints that were imposed by senior authority on the introduction of new weapons on the battlefield. Of course, the President made the ultimate decision in this regard.

But other than that the President never tried to tell me how to run the war. The tactics and battlefield strategy of running the war were mine. He did not interfere with this. He deferred to my judgment, and he let me run the war or pursue tactics and battlefield strategy as I saw fit. He backed me and supported me without exception. Now this is
contrary to, I'm sure, the general public understanding because there have been many editorials suggesting the contrary. But other than the restraints imposed and where my recommendations were considered—not always accepted, but ultimately they were accepted in the main, relaxation on the use of these systems was gradual, and based on political considerations.

I realized that this war involved our relationships with our allies, world opinion, public opinion, psychological and political factors did play a role, and these had to be considered by the Commander in Chief in addition to military factors in making decisions. But as far as the tactics and battlefield strategy of running the war, he left this up to me. He did not interfere. As a matter of fact, he didn't even pass judgment. I, in effect, had a carte blanche in the devising and pursuing tactics and the battlefield strategy of the war.

Now a good case in point was the much publicized Battle of Khe Sanh, sometimes referred to as the "Siege of Khe Sanh" which was greatly magnified by press reports, and which was described as "another Dien Bien Phu." Many of the articles and the editorials allege that this was an unwise move and that we were destined to lose. They were articles fraught with the gloom and doom. The President, of course, followed the news very carefully. He was influenced, very much by the television; by editorials; by news articles. He spent a great deal of his time listening to television, and reading the newspapers. The gloom and doom concerned him. Therefore, he developed in his mind an exaggerated picture of the real situation at Khe Sanh. I sent word to the President in a telephone call that I had with General Wheeler to this effect, and this is a quote: I said: "Please tell the President not to worry about Khe Sanh, that we're in good shape, and that I assume full responsibility."
General Wheeler previous to that statement had indicated that he had been at the White House and there had been considerable discussion. All members of the conference had likewise been influenced by these articles and were very concerned about the situation.

Now I'm not suggesting that I was complacent about the situation. This was a real challenge, but I never had any doubt about the outcome. Of course, history speaks for itself as to the outcome.

DM: General, your face-to-face meetings were really your only direct communication with the President during your four year period.

WW: Yes. My day-to-day business was done through military channels. I went through CINCPAC in Hawaii, and through General Wheeler in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Usually, most of my communications would go direct to Washington with information copy to CINCPAC--Admiral Sharp, in Honolulu, who would comment as appropriate. On the other had there were a number of matters under his [CINCPAC] cognizance which I would send to him, and he would forward his recommendations to Washington. You see, there was an intermediate military command between the Pentagon and my headquarters, namely, a Commander in Chief, Pacific, in Hawaii. But in order to save time and to expedite the carrying on of business, Washington usually got my reports and communications concurrently with Commander in Chief, Pacific, in Honolulu.

DM: I believe we had better cut here then.

WW: Sure.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I]