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Date

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Date
INTERVIEW I

DATE: March 2, 1981
INTERVIEWEE: GENERAL SAMUEL T. WILLIAMS
INTERVIEWER: TED GITTINGER
PLACE: General Williams' residence, San Antonio, Texas

Tape 1 of 2

G: General Williams, what had been your assignments in the four or five years prior to your going to Vietnam in November of 1955?

W: Well, I can answer that specifically. In 1950 I was with Headquarters Army Field Forces at Fort Monroe, Virginia, as deputy G-3. The commanding general was General Mark Clark. A most outstanding officer. I went to Korea from there in 1952 and took command of the 25th Infantry Division. General Van Fleet, one of the best in our army was 8th Army commanding general. I stayed with that elite division and that assignment up until the time I left Korea, which was shortly after the armistice in July of 1953. However, the last couple of months of that assignment I was on duty with the 2nd Korean Corps, actually on loan. I still retained command of the 25th Division and [was] assigned to the 25th Division. But I turned command over to my senior general officer in the division, an artilleryman by the name of Louis Heath, while I went over and acted as deputy corps commander for the 2nd Korean Corps.

G: Was that General Kwon, General Chung Il Kwon?

W: Yes. He later became chief of staff of the Korean army and I think later became an ambassador to the United States, though I'm not too
Williams -- 1 -- 2

sure about that. Later when I was in South Vietnam he came down and visited me there. Yes. There should be a picture here somewhere on my wall. There's Chung Il Kwon right there and General Le of the Vietnamese army and myself and I forget who that admiral is--

G: The admiral from Thailand.

W: Thailand, yes. Looks like four big fat frogs there. We were having a dinner party in Saigon when that picture was taken.

From Korea I went to assignment in Sendai, Japan to command the 16th United States Army Corps.

G: Those were occupation troops.

W: Yes. After about six months General [Maxwell] Taylor, then the 8th Army commander, asked that I return to Korea to command the 9th U.S. Army Corps Group. So I went back to Korea to command the 9th Corps Group. Then near the end of my second Korean tour, shortly after that, although still retaining command of the 9th Corps Group, which was three or four American divisions and one Korean corps--Korean 5th Corps if I remember correctly--I went up to General Taylor's headquarters as his deputy 8th Army commander.

1954 I came to San Antonio as deputy 4th Army commander. The commanding general 4th Army at that time was Lieutenant General I. D. White, Armor. When White was ordered to Korea to become commanding general of the American forces in Korea and to get his fourth star, I became the commanding general of the 4th Army here at San Antonio.
In 1955 I received a message from General Taylor, now chief of staff, U.S. Army. He wanted to know if there was any cogent reason why I shouldn't go to South Vietnam to relieve, or to replace General Mike, or Iron Mike, O'Daniel.

G: Excuse me, sir, you called him Iron Mike.
W: Yes.

G: And I have heard you called Hanging Sam.
W: Yes.

G: Can you tell me why or how you acquired that nickname?
W: Yes. I was stationed at Camp Swift, Texas, in command of the 378th Infantry, the 95th Division, and a soldier, a truckdriver, picked up a nine or ten year old girl that lived in Bastrop--Camp Swift, Texas is outside of Bastrop, or was--and he raped this child and in doing so was so vicious that he tore her body about six inches. We were all quite perturbed about that because we had some colored troops at Camp Swift, and Bastrop was not used to colored soldiers and we were all on edge about that, being fearful the rapist might be black. Frankly, I was quite relieved when I found out he was a white soldier out of my regiment and not some Negro soldier.

But anyway, he was quickly apprehended. We had conclusive proof that he was the man who committed the murder. A court martial was convened and I was a member of the court. We heard all the witnesses pro and con, and then they brought in two men to testify that the soldier was insane. After the defense had put up these two psychiatrists to testify that soldier was insane, the prosecution
brought in two other psychiatrists to prove that he was sane. Well, we were dragging on there and wasting time. Then pretty soon they brought in two more, which made six psychiatrists, and I asked, "What are these two people for?" I wasn't the president of the court, I was merely a member of it. The president should have asked the question. They said, "These two gentlemen are going to tell us what the other four meant when they were testifying here." And speaking too quickly and probably not very smartly I said, "Well, we don't give a damn what the psychiatrists say, the man is proven guilty and we're going to hang him and we might as well get this trial over as quick as we can." So we got it over as quickly as we could and we sentenced the man to death.

The news got out, and people started calling me 'Hanging Sam.' Terrible nickname. But by God, it's been in the army for an awful long time and to some a name of endearment. Now, a lot of people thought it was because I was at Nuremburg and had the Nuremburg Fourth Enclave at the time of the execution of the war crime criminals. But I had that name long before I was at Nuremburg.

Well, now to come back to finish your question, Taylor sent me a message and wanted to know if there were any cogent reasons why I shouldn't go to South Vietnam to relieve Mike O'Daniel, who was due for relief. Mike had already retired once, he was on retired status then, and he had been out there for a couple of years and Department of the Army thought there should be a change. I said there was no particular reason I shouldn't go, except for
the last ten or twelve years I had spent most of my time either in Europe or Korea or Japan and outside the United States. The Department of the Army came back and said that I would go on such-and-such a date.

So I went out to Vietnam in October of 1955 and relieved General John O'Daniel. He came back to the States and retired for a second time. That's what I did the last four or five years before I went out to Vietnam. I went out there presumably on a two-year tour. In other words, I was supposed to come back in 1957, but my tour was extended several times. There was a provision in regulations at that time, whether the same regulations hold true now or not I don't know, whereby the President could retain beyond retirement age four general officers. They asked me if I would stay on beyond retirement age because I had already passed my sixtieth birthday and had possibly thirty-nine or forty years service. I said yes, and so my tour was extended once or twice, I think, I'm pretty sure, partly at the insistence of President Ngo Dinh Diem. My relations with Diem were very pleasant. Later I received notice that I would retire on the thirty-first day of August of 1960. I did, and came back here to San Antonio to establish our home.

When you were getting ready to go to South Vietnam, were you given any special briefing, any special instructions either from Washington or did perhaps General O'Daniel give you any special briefing or advice when you arrived?
Williams -- I -- 6

W: Well, first, I was sent to Washington and was briefed by everyone that you can imagine up there, all the G-1,2,3,4s, the Adjutant General, and so on and so forth, the Chief of Staff, or people in his office, and was also sent over to the State Department to be interviewed there. I understood that I was to go to the State Department to see if they would be willing for me to be the chief of MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] in Vietnam. Seemingly that amounted to little. I went to State, was in a waiting room, then I was taken to another room, all was very casual. Someone, I don't remember now who it was, came in and sat down and we talked for a few minutes about this and that, nothing of importance. I remember one question he asked me, he asked if I spoke French, and I told him no, that if I went out to Vietnam I would have to rely on French interpreters. He didn't ask me if I could speak Vietnamese. Of course, I couldn't, but they didn't ask me that question. We sat there and chatted pleasantly for maybe five or ten minutes, like you and I were doing here a few minutes ago. Finally I said, "Well, I came over here to be interviewed prior to my being detailed to South Vietnam." He said, "General, you have just been interviewed. We hope you have a pleasant tour out there. Good morning," so forth, got up and walked out. Now that was my State Department briefing. But the other people in Washington, including the G-1,2,3,4 of the Army were very thorough, in fact, so much so that in the one, two, or three days I was there I couldn't remember half of what they told me.
There was one thing they did tell me that I found of particular interest later. The G-2 of the army at that time was an old acquaintance of mine. He picked me up in one of those offices at the Pentagon and took me to the G-2 offices, the Army Department G-2, which was his office. He went through a series of doors which were unlocked in front of me and locked behind me. He was with me all the time, he was a major general, the G-2. Finally we came to a very small briefing room and sat down. A major got up and started to brief us on conditions in Vietnam. What he told us, I can't recall, although I was drinking it all in as much as I could.

But I remembered distinctly, he said, "Now the CIA is going to try to infiltrate your group, and if you get any idea at all of any CIA infiltration, let us know instantly." I said, "I'll sure do it." Later on while I was at Washington I was briefed by the CIA and they told me they had eleven people in MAAG. I thought, Jesus God Almighty, these people with the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing. And it turned out, now you mentioned [Edward] Lansdale, Lansdale had a section of eleven CIA men in Saigon at the same time this major in the army G-2 was saying if you detect one CIA man, let us know instantly.

G: I want to come to that. What was your general impression after all of your briefings? What kind of an assignment did you think this was going to be?

W: Well, of course, I left Washington with mixed feelings, but I had no apprehensions about the job at all because I had served with,
or had had contact with, a lot of foreign people. I had not only fought the Germans in two wars, I had been in the army of occupation in 1919 also, and I didn't leave Germany until 1949 or 1950 after the last war. I had been used to getting along with the Germans, both civilian and police and with the Red Army and the Czechs. I had had quite a bit of experience with the Koreans, and I had a good rapport with them and President Rhee. When I would go in the lines in Korea with my division, if there was a Korean division on my right or on my left I made it my business to cultivate the division commanders and the regimental commanders of those Korean units, and so I got to know them pretty well. I got to know many of them damn good as a matter of fact, and that's one reason undoubtedly that when the 2nd ROK Corps got in trouble in June and July of 1953, General Taylor called me on the telephone about five or six o'clock one morning, at my CP, and told me to go over to the 2nd ROK Corps. I had gone over there and stayed a couple of weeks. That was in June. One day when he came by the 2nd ROK Corps I told him, "I'm not needed here any longer. These people can now take care of themselves." He said, "All right, you go back home." So I went back to the 25th Division.

Then one morning in July, again along about daylight, he called me on the phone and he said, "Your friends over to your right are in trouble. Get over there as fast as you can go." I said, "I'll take off in five minutes." I did, going by helicopter. I took my aide de camp, Lieutenant by the name of George McBride,
and started him out with my "shotgun" man and a Korean sergeant I had as an interpreter. They went by jeep and I went by helicopter immediately to the 2nd ROK Corps. The 2nd ROK Corps was under heavy attack and pretty serious situation, not too bad initially, but--well, there's no use going into that last big Chinese offensive, I don't think you want to know about that.

G: Was that the Kumsong salient?

W: That's right, that's right. They hit the 2nd ROK Corps with a Chinese army, and we had an awful hard time. That wasn't so much the fault of the 2nd ROK Corps, but on the left of the 2nd ROK Corps was the United States 9th Army Corps. 8th Army had assigned some Korean divisions to the 9th Corps and one of them happened to be on the 9th Corps' right flank, which made them on the left flank of the 2nd ROK Corps. Knowing the danger of boundaries in situations of that type, I was careful to see I had that left boundary tied in tight as it could possibly be. On my right flank, the 2nd Corps' right flank, was Lieutenant General I. D. White with the 10th U.S. Corps. I had no particular fear there because we had an enormous big river that separated us and the 10th Corps and I wasn't too apprehensive about anyone coming around through I. D. White's sector.

Each morning along about four-thirty or five o'clock I made a habit of checking these different ROK divisions of the 2nd Corps. There were four or five. I did it by telephone. This particular morning I called the CG of the 6th ROK Division, which was my left division, and asked him how things were on his front. He said his
division was all right. Now, I had caused him to have his left frontline regiment—now, you can understand this because you've had military service. However, some people listening to this are going to get confused, but anyway, they shouldn't. The very left ROK division in the 2nd ROK Corps had sent over into the American 9th Corps a small detachment, I think a squad or a little more, and the same way with that division over there in the 9th Corps, which if I remember correctly was the Capitol ROK Division; they had sent over a light detachment into the 6th ROK Division. So I had those people interlocked. I asked the division commander how he was getting along, he said all right. Because we were under constant attack, but the Chinese were making little progress. We were holding. I said, "What about your left regiment?" He said, "Okay." I said, "Your contact with the Capitol ROK Division okay?" "Yes, sir, it sure is." That was all there was to that conversation. I then phoned the G-2 and G-3 of the 9th Corps and got an all's well from them, also.

I bring this out though for a particular purpose, because later that morning, not too much later that morning, one of the ROK division commanders in the 2nd ROK Corps reported to me, "There are some Chinamen back in my artillery." That didn't perturb me at all, because our 2nd Corps lines were intact. I said, "Well, some of those Chinese have infiltrated. Get a couple of patrols back there and scoop up the infiltrators and get them the hell out of the way,"
Shortly after that, General Max Taylor sets down near me in a chopper. He had found out from corps headquarters where I was and he came to that particular place and sat down in the field there in the chopper and asked me how things were. I said, "All right, we're holding. A few Chinese showed up back in our artillery this morning, but they'll be taken care of." He said, "I'm not too sure." I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "That Capitol ROK Division"—I think it was the Capitol ROK, now it could have been the White Horse Division, but it doesn't make any difference, it was the division under the 9th Corps. He said, "They gave way during the night and there's no ROK division there now. There's not just a few Chinese in your artillery. The Chinese are now marching in strength where that ROK division was. They're marching through there in columns of four. They will attempt to turn the left flank of the 2nd ROK Corps." Well, hell, that presented an entirely different situation, a serious one.

But finally we got out of that all right. They drove us back five kilometers on one flank and fifteen kilometers on the other before we could counter-attack. It was a tough battle and the Koreans were most appreciative of my help in it, but I don't think you want to go into that. You're talking about Vietnam.

G: Well, let's bring it back to the point when you're leaving the United States for Vietnam.

W: Yes.
G: What was your first impression of your MAAG people and Saigon when you first arrived?

W: Well, I would say the whole thing looked like it was an enormous mess. It wasn't anyone's fault particularly; we didn't have very many people out there. That was one trouble with MAAG, they never had enough people to do what they were told to do. And there were very few U.S. military there--Mike O'Daniel didn't have a great deal of help. He had one brigadier that was not the strongest general officer I've ever known, and his headquarters was in a dilapidated, or gutted Chinese building in Cholon. The noise there was terrific from the street noises and things of that nature. Mike hadn't been able to set up any workable administrative system in his headquarters. Frankly I would say that Mike, I had known him since 1925 and we were intimate friends, was not an administrator. He was an aggressive fighter in peace and war but he knew no more about running an office than the man in the moon, and he didn't have anyone to run it for him. So he had no files nor reliable records nor anything of that nature. He was out all the time from daylight till dark, as hard as he could go, trying to get things done out in the field. That was the impression I had of MAAG when I got there. One man driving hard to get things done and with little help.

G: What exactly was General O'Daniel trying to accomplish?

W: He was trying to get some kind of organization in the Vietnamese army and air force and navy, but his primary work had been at that time to help receive almost a million refugees from up around the
Hanoi area. They were moving down into South Vietnam to escape the
to escape the communist government of North Vietnam. Now, you
seldom hear or read about that, but right after the Geneva accords,
Ho Chi Minh said he'd let those people go south that wanted to go
south. Well, they didn't let all go but they let a hell of a lot
of them go south, and there was no organization to receive them,
feed them or do anything else, so Mike O'Daniel at least got tentage
shipped in there and pitched camps for refugees. I have no idea what
the figure was, but I've heard the figure ran anywhere from five
hundred thousand to almost a million refugees that came south. That's
what Mike was doing mostly, and he was doing it mostly by himself
with his bare hands as the South Vietnamese he had to work with were
not used to doing things like that.

G: How many people were in HOAG at about this time?
W: Oh, I think we had around two hundred maybe.
G: A large company?
W: Yes, that's right. They were about equally divided among non-com-
missioned officers and officers. Now that's a rough guess, I don't
remember. After I got going there I tried valiantly to raise that
figure. I wanted a minimum of two thousand, but the people state-
side could not agree on that strength. Now here was the reason.
The Geneva accords, which we never signed, but Bedell Smith said
in his infinite wisdom that we would adhere to, stipulated that any
U.S. military that came in would be replacements for the people who
were on hand at the time the accords were signed. Or in other words,
we would not increase. Well, when that happened there was anywhere from two or maybe I'd say on the outside four hundred officers and men in South Vietnam that were Americans. There was an International Control Commission made up of some army officers from India, from Canada and Poland. The Indians were violently against us from the day that I got there until the day I left. They were against Mike, too. The Canadians were very much for westerners, and the Poles, they held a swing, one way or the other. Now that commission would monitor very closely every U.S. military person or piece of equipment that came in or out of Vietnam. If I got some replacements out there I had to show by name, rank, organization who they were, how many they were, and exactly who they were replacing. Those Indians worked on that to a degree.

So Mike didn't have enough Americans to work with, and for a long time I was terribly handicapped before I could get any additional people. Finally we were able to get what we called "training teams," a few technicians for this, a few technicians for that, to come out, a team of three or four, something like that, and stay for a certain number of days or weeks and then go back. That's the way we were doing it because it took the bureaucracy of the Control Commission so long to operate, the teams would be in and out before the hell they could do anything about it. That's the way we got any additional help at all.

G: Was the situation ever resolved?
W: No. No, it was not resolved, and it went further than that, because each piece of equipment—and we're fixing to get into that again I'm afraid—shipped in there had to be a replacement for a piece of equipment that was there at the time of the Geneva accords.

G: How could you know what was there at the time?

W: You couldn't, you couldn't. But anytime that we got anything shipped in I had to show the commission that some number of items were being destroyed. Regardless if it was vehicles or anything else, we had to show item for item. Say we're getting in ten jeeps. All right, we had to show them ten jeeps that were going on the salvage pile right then to be cut up. So then we could bring in ten more jeeps. They made things as rough as possible. Pure harassment. I remember that one time one of my sergeants was absolutely browned off. American soldiers will only put up with so much. He came to me because he was cutting up some old one-pounder cannons. Very likely you are not familiar with those, but in World War II we had a one-pounder gun that was our original anti-tank gun. You'd shoot that against any tank and its shell would bounce off, but nevertheless that was what we had. Well, we were going to destroy some of those to get them off our invoice. And we were cutting those barrels in about two or two-and-a-half-foot lengths and throwing them in the scrap heap. The commission came along and said, "You can't do that. You've got to go back and cut these barrels again, and each one of those two-foot barrels you have to cut them into one-foot lengths." Well, that's just harassment.
Blowing ammunition. There was ammunition all over Vietnam at that time, and large piles of it. I asked my counterpart there, a Frenchman, [Pierre] Jacquot, General Jacquot, "What the hell were the French doing with so much ammunition? Here, there, yonder, there's piles of it all over Vietnam." He said, "It's simple. We were getting ammunition from you, from the States, and if we wanted some ammunition at Hue, it would be better to have it unloaded at Hue than it would be to unload it in Saigon and we then tried to ship it up there. So anyplace where we needed the ammunition, that's where we asked the ammunition be placed." Then they ran off and left lots of it, and there it was. It had deteriorated and had to be destroyed before we could ship in some decent replacement ammunition.

I remember one time I notified the commission that we were going to blow a certain number of tons of ammunition at a certain place and time and we'd dug an enormous pit and put that old ammo in there. They hadn't shown up, our people went ahead and had that pit about half full on the way to blow it and the commission came and they said, "What's in there?" The U.S. sergeant said so and so, and they said, "We don't know it. Dig it out of there, let us see it and then put it back." That's when the sergeant blew his top and came to me and said, "General, we're just not going to do it." I said, "I know you're not going to do it. Just tell them to go to hell and go ahead and blow it." Well, the commission didn't do anything about it, but it's that harassment--oh, they'd make reports
about it, they'd make a report to Hanoi, they'd make reports of it to the Vietnamese and so forth, and to Washington: "the Americans are not doing this, that and the other. They are bullheaded." But that was the kind of stuff we were running into all the time. It was just like molasses in January.

Did that answer your question?

G: Yes, sir. I was just going to ask you about certain people. Now I think at one place General Lansdale says that he spent his first interview with you getting royally chewed out. Do you remember that incident?

W: Yes, I remember it quite well. Because he hasn't let me forget it. First of all, I didn't see Lansdale until after I moved that headquarters out of Cholon, where I had found it, and taken over another building in a better part of town. It was a larger building and better located. The chief of staff or headquarters commandant, or whoever was handling that kind of work at that time, had divided it up and assigned the offices here, there and yonder. Then it suddenly dawned on me--Lansdale was there and I think he had eleven people with him, but they had not come to my attention prior to that, and if they had, it just went over my head. But one morning, one day, I was coming up the front steps of the MAAG headquarters and an American, or at least a Caucasian, unshaven, dirty as hell, in a very dilapidated automobile drove up and got out and left his automobile standing there where he shouldn't have, and went up the steps into the headquarters. The first officer I saw I asked, "Who is
that character?" I didn't know if he had any business being in the MAAG headquarters. At that time we didn't have guards on our headquarters. He said, "He's one of Lansdale's people." So I sent for Lansdale and I told him about this incident, and I told him I wanted him to get his people spruced up a little bit.

Well, he didn't make it clear to me, which he should have, or maybe I was a little slow on the uptake, but he had his people looking that way on purpose. They were CIA operators and they were working all over the country and he didn't want them dressed up looking like good, prosperous Americans.

G: Were these military personnel in civilian clothes?
W: I don't know, I don't know if they were military or civilian. I never inquired into his business that much. Lansdale, I was talking to him in my office and he was sitting there--do you know Lansdale?
G: No, sir.
W: Well, he's a very fine-looking officer. But he also has a dreamy look. He can lounge back on a divan or a chair and kind of look at the ceiling, look at the walls with a kind of a dreamy look, and you just think that you're spitting against the wind, that he's not hearing a damn thing you say. So I had to wake him up. He wrote in his book [In the Midst of War: An American Mission to Southeast Asia], which he sent and asked me what I thought about it, that I jumped on him and did it in such a voice that I could be heard all over Vietnam. Maybe I did.

But he also wrote in that book that I reminded him of either
his father or his grandfather. Anyway, he said he took a liking to me right then and actually invited me to supper that night, and we had a very pleasant time. Well, I don't remember that part of it. Lansdale and I never did have any major differences. I didn't know much about his business, and I don't think he knew a hell of a lot about mine. There was mutual respect. I liked him.

He was working at that time with a group of people that he had brought over from the Philippines, and he never told me, or no one else told me, but it was my assumption that he had brought these people over, and actually they were men and women nurses, maybe Red Cross people, and they worked all over Vietnam and I think those were his informers. I'm sure they were.

G: I think he called that Operation Brotherhood.
W: That's right.
G: What was his official capacity exactly?
W: He was a member of MAAG, and his rank at that time was lieutenant colonel.
G: But you more or less held him on a loose rein?
W: Absolutely. I had nothing to do with his business at all, never gave him any orders, because I believed he was working directly for the CIA and I didn't want to get my fingers into that business at all, especially after the army told me that if I found a CIA man in my headquarters to report it immediately. I thought, if that's the way they're running things back there, if they don't know what's going on, well, I'm not going to enter into it at all.
G: Did you ever notify Washington that Lansdale was working for the CIA and not for--?

W: I don't ever remember mentioning Lansdale in any official letters or dispatches. I gave him a free rein.

G: Did he report to you on what he was doing or directly to Washington?

W: As I recall he would come in every once in a while and give me briefings and discuss conditions and so forth, and I judged what he told me was what he was damn willing for me to know, and that was all. Any reports he was making, official reports, I'm positive he was making direct to his people back in Washington. I had too many problems of my own to think about CIA affairs.

Lansdale is a very unusual man. He's had a lot of experience in Asia with Asiatics and with the Filipinos. He got this notoriety of being the man that they modeled The Ugly American after, which I don't think is true. I don't think they modeled him on Lansdale at all. Lansdale is intelligent. I mean by that that he knew his way around. I think he's smart as hell. I like him.

G: What was his relationship to President Diem?

W: I don't know. I know that Diem knew him, and I imagine that Diem very likely mentioned his name occasionally to me. I remember one time a year or so later when some Americans were going to come out, a committee was going to come out to Vietnam and the Vietnamese were in conference with the embassy on this subject. The embassy saw Lansdale's name on the list of visitors and vetoed him, said he couldn't come. President Diem told me that and said, "What do you
think about it?" I said, "Hell, you know Lansdale as well as I do. I think he's done a wonderful thing for your country in the work he's done here, and if you want him to visit, okay, bring him out."
And he came out. I imagine that if they knew about it, my comment to Diem very likely irritated the American Ambassador. I don't know. But anyway, Lansdale I would say on occasion was not getting along too well with the embassy. Whether he was or not, I don't know.
Or it might be that the CIA man at the embassy at that time and Lansdale were at cross-purposes. I don't know.

G: Lansdale came back about two years before you did. Isn't that about right? Something on that order.
W: I don't remember.
G: Do you know what he did after he came back to the States. I've heard that he continued to work on Vietnam problems, and I was wondering if you had any contact with him after he left Vietnam?
W: I think we exchanged personal letters.
G: Not official contact?
W: Oh, no. I presume he came back and was working with the CIA here in the States. That's the best of my knowledge. In years past I've had a terrific amount of correspondence with the people, officers and soldiers. I get letters now from soldiers that I haven't seen in twenty or thirty years. Sometimes they come see me. The same with the officers. Sometimes an officer will call me long distance on the telephone and I'll have to get out of it as well as I can by saying, "Hell, by George, when was the last time we served
Williams -- I -- 22

together?" If he tells me that, then I can chop these periods of
time off into compartments and often be able to place a person.
Sometimes I can, sometimes I can't. But I mention that because it
would not be unusual for me not to remember any specific correspon-
dence between myself and Lansdale at this minute.

G: Right. I don't mean to dwell on Lansdale. It's only that he has
a lot of notoriety, and you're obviously a primary source about
Lansdale. So I don't want to let that get away untouched.

What was the atmosphere in Saigon in the countryside when you
arrived? How would you describe the--

W: Very pleasant, very pleasant. We had no problems there except the
problem of dealing with Vietnamese who were inefficient. Now, when
I say inefficient, I'm--well, let me take specific cases. The French
were there and they controlled everything. Most of the merchants
either thought a great deal of the French or they might have been
French merchants. I testified before Mike Mansfield's Senate com-
mittee in Washington one time that the French objected to our being
there and resented it very much. Our State Department took exception
to that and Ambassador Durbrow tried to get me to withdraw that
statement. I declined to withdraw it, and I told him, "How in the
hell can I withdraw it? You know at one of these committee meetings
how many stenographers there are typing as the witness talks. Here
are all these senators up here listening to me. You want me to come
out tomorrow and say I didn't say so and so? How goddamned stupid
would that be?" Threats were made but I refused to change my statements.
But the French objected to us. They always said that I was trying to do a job that couldn't be done. They said, "You can't organize a Vietnamese army. The Vietnamese will never fight. They're not worth a damn." My answer to that was, on one occasion to a senior French officer out there, "Hell, they just got through whipping your ass and driving you out of this country. What do you mean they won't fight?" "Well," he said, "that's the Vietnamese up north." I said, "Well, they're bound to be cousins to these down here. I think they'll fight if they're given proper training and have any leadership."

But it must be remembered that the senior officers in the Vietnamese army had been lieutenants and captains in the French colonial army. The chief of staff, the senior officer in the Vietnamese army, was a man by the name of Lieutenant General Ty, spelled T-Y. Ty had been a noncommissioned officer in the French colonial forces in World War I, in a transportation company, a truck transport company and had served in France. In World War II he was a company commander and a battalion commander. The Japanese came in and the French were cooperating with them at that time, and suddenly when the Vietnamese found out that the Japanese were going to take over--Ty told me this himself—he said, "I told my soldiers what was happening." He said, "I'm going to the jungle. You fellows go where you like." He said, "We disintegrated overnight (snaps fingers), just like that." Now, he was very outspoken in telling me that. I think the same thing happened to a hell of a lot of these Vietnamese
officers that I had to work with because when the French came back, by grace of the Americans and the British after World War II, they arrested some of these officers and court-martialed them. But they didn't sentence them as far as I know, but they threw the fear of God in them.

Now we'll take this man Big [Duong Van] Minh as an example. Big Minh was a very close friend of a man by the name of T-H-O, who became vice president of Vietnam. Big Minh and I were very close.

I asked him one time, "What was your relation with Vice President [Nguyen Ngoc] Tho?" He said, "We were in prison together." I said, "Where?" He said, "Right here. The French had us in prison. It was terrible. They had us confined, many of us, in very small rooms. It was more horrible than you could think of. There was no place to relieve ourselves and we'd defecate on the floor, we'd urinate on the floor, and sometimes we'd be ankle deep. Tho got released." Why the French let him out I don't know, and that's beside the point. But he said, "After Tho got out, he got me released." Big Minh had been a first lieutenant in the French colonial army at the time the Japanese came in and he took off. So the French were holding him for desertion. But they never did try him, to the best of my knowledge. I think he feared them.

So these people that we were working with had held jobs as lieutenants or captains, at the most, in the French colonial army, but in which they were never allowed to do anything of any importance.
Now we'll take another incident, that of Tran Van Don, who was Ty's chief of staff when I was there, and was also an intimate friend of Big Minh. Don served in the French army, not the colonial army, but the French army in World War II, as he was a Frenchman. His father was a doctor and had gone from Vietnam to France and the family was there when Don was born. So Don was a Frenchman by nationality. World War II came on. Don went into the army. He was commissioned in the French regular army, not the colonial. I said, "Hell, Don, did any of these race problems ever come up at different times?" He said, "Hell, no, not exactly. But this would happen if my company commander, who would be a Frenchman, happened to go someplace and I would be the senior lieutenant, something would happen, and a French lieutenant would come and take command and I would be sent somewhere else until the regular company commander came back."

So that's the way they were treating these people.

You've asked questions in here about Diem and his officers. Now, we'll take the man by the name of [Mai Huu] Xuan, X-U-A-N. Diem told me on one occasion he didn't trust him. He was either brigadier or major general at that time. I said, "Why?" He said, "Because he was once in the French army intelligence. Any man who was ever once in the French army intelligence is always in the French army intelligence up until the day he dies. And so that man is still under obligation to the French army intelligence. That's why I don't trust him as a general in the Vietnamese army." Much
later this was the man in charge of Diem and his brother when Diem was murdered.

G: Was this a common problem, this divided allegiance of officers?

W: Yes. Most of those people have dual citizenship and had dual passports.

Now we'll take an occasion when the French were turning over to us their excess property that they didn't want. We'd find that in each one of these warehouses or depots, there would be a Vietnamese officer as second-in-command. The French would turn over this material and we'd go in there to look at it, see what they had turned in and try to invoice it as we didn't know what was there. We'd find property in the most terrible condition. Boxes of spare parts broken open, and the paperwork inside the box listing contents, spare parts for an H-16 or spare parts for an M-1 or whatnot, they'd be gone. I'd say to this Vietnamese, second in command, "Well, you've been working here, you've been assigned to this depot for how long?" Such and such. "Well, why does this mess occur? Where are the records? And those officers would invariably say, and I believed them, because I heard it so many times, "I had nothing to do. I was not allowed to do anything. Sure, I was carried here as a deputy for this depot. I don't know what's in this depot, what comes in or what goes out, because I was never allowed to do anything or see anything." But the French could always say, "I have a Vietnamese deputy here."
Now it comes back to advisors again, which we worked out by getting these U.S. training teams out. If I went into a storehouse or warehouse that covers hundreds of square feet of storage I find there's crate after crate of spare parts, for weapons, rifles, machine guns, automatic rifles, mortars or anything else. The boxes have been torn open, the stuff not necessarily spilled out on the floor, but sometimes out on the floor. I'd look at that, and well, hell, ninety-nine times out of a hundred I could look at it and I'd say, "I don't know whether this comes out of a Browning automatic rifle or whether it came out of an M-1 rifle." Because I didn't know enough about spare parts. The Vietnamese didn't know anything about spare parts. I was trying to get trained ordnance people from the States to come over there and try to sort this stuff out. Otherwise it was just going to waste as junk. I couldn't get it done. Now the Secretary of the Army, Mr. [Wilber M.] Brucker, was with me a hundred per cent, but he couldn't get it done.

Now we had a place there we called the Acre of Diamonds. The French had come in and dumped equipment there. The first time I heard about the Acre of Diamonds I immediately went there and looked. The French were bringing in surplus material and dumping it. I saw Cadillac engines that never had an ounce of gasoline burned through them, sitting in the mud, halfway sunk in the mud. Things of that nature, artillery pieces, anything you could possibly imagine, bulldozers, trucks, just driven into this, what we called the Acre of Diamonds, and left there in the mud and the weather. Well, I tell
you what it eventually came to, eventually we just had to salvage the whole damn business. When we finally got some technical people in there, ordnance and engineers and so forth, they said, "Well, it's hopeless, you might as well just bury the whole damn lot and let it go." But we didn't bury it. We let it sit there so that when congressmen and senators would come over on visits we'd say, "All right, here is what we found. Here is what the situation was. That's what we've got."

So there was one problem. Vietnamese officer and the noncommissioned officers had seldom been allowed to do anything. They had never been given command. The French had gone so far as to organize what they called light infantry Vietnamese battalions to fight the North Vietnamese, and their comment was, "We formed these light battalions to throw them in against the North Vietnamese. We let the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese get out there and wallow in the mud with each other. What happens, we don't give a damn." Now a smart Vietnamese officer, one that's really been through the French schools in France could see what was happening to them. Now for instance, along about the time of Dien Bien Phu in that time period--one of them told me this one time when I was watching a division maneuver exercise. I saw these people, the regimental commanders and battalions commanders, seemed apprehensive and were always looking over their shoulder, and so I had conversations with a senior officer through my interpreter. The last flight that several of those officers had been into was like this:
They had been on a campaign up north with the French and the French were of course quite strong, they had a division or so, or several regiments. They took this one Vietnamese regiment, and said, "We're going to attack. You're going to lead out. You're going to lead the attack. We're right behind you with a French regiment here and a French regiment there and when we get going right, we're coming in here and going in there to support you."
And the senior officer said, "We'd started the attack and got going good and looked around to wait for the French to come up on our right and left, but they started a withdrawal action at the same time they ordered us to attack. That left us alone and we were defeated badly." Now they'd tell me stories like that. So they didn't trust anyone, and it took a great deal of living with and association with the Vietnamese to get them to change over and have some semblance of confidence with the Americans that they were working with. At first they just didn't trust anyone at all. Finally the military began to accept MAAG as good friends and cooperated.

Well, I could talk about that for ages, but I don't think that's what you want.

G: Well, what were you getting the Vietnamese army ready for? What was the prime threat as you analyzed it in those early days?
W: When I had my last conversation in the Pentagon with the Chief of Staff of the army, or his staff, they told me that there was an agreement, presumed agreement, that general free elections would be held in Vietnam, North and South Vietnam, one year after the
signing of the Geneva accords, and I believe without going back, but somewhere in my mind the Geneva accords were signed in June or July. If the elections were not held, then North Vietnam was going to attack and conquer South Vietnam. They said, "Now, we don't believe that President Diem is going to agree to general elections." Well, they were right, he wouldn't agree. So, the thing uppermost in my mind when I got there in October was that I had until next July to get something up on the [17th] Parallel to withstand an attack in July of 1956.

That was my primary purpose, to get something up there and get them in some kind of shape, and I believed that so strongly that--although I didn't have the authority to command, I just went up there. I think the 1st Vietnamese Division was in that area at that time. I went up there and lived with that division commander for about a week before I thought the attack was going to be made and stayed up there for about an extra week, so that I could be there and be of any assistance I could with those people in case the attack came. So that's what I had in mind when I went in there in 1955, that we were going to fight a North Korean type of invasion in July of 1956. As a matter of fact, I thought that for at least two years. I thought each year that this was going to be next thing to come.

G: Were the sects still much of a problem when you arrived in South Vietnam?

W: Yes. To a degree.
G: The Bao Dai--

W: They were.

G: --or the Hoa Hao, I mean.

W: Yes, they were, but not both at the same time. When one sect would be up in arms, the others would seem to be taking it easy. In other words, as I remember it, they never did fight all at one time. Incidentally this man Big Minh I spoke of a while ago, had gotten a semblance of fame and notoriety there, before I arrived. He had taken some Vietnamese troops and cleaned out some of those sects from around Saigon. Not only did Lansdale tell me this, but Mike O'Daniel told me that when Big Minh almost had the sects where he was going to destroy them completely, the French moved some troops in between the Vietnamese and the sects. The Vietnamese decided they were going to call the battle off because if they didn't call it off they'd have to fight through the French troops to get to the sects.

G: Was that the Binh Xuyen, or do you remember that?

W: I don't remember. It was down in the south, below Saigon. You see, the French had us, in many ways, because among other troops that they had, they had some Foreign Legionnaires, some of the best-looking soldiers you ever saw in your life. Any time I went to French headquarters there would always be one of those Legionnaires or two of them on guard at the door. I used to talk to them. I couldn't speak German, but I made a pass at it.

G: Were they mostly Germans?
W: Yes. Almost 90 per cent. With those French Legionnaires, the French could do anything they wanted to. I never had any close contact with any French soldiers in Vietnam, only French officers. The only French soldiers I ever came in contact with were Foreign Legionnaires. They had a Moroccan band with them. One time I said to General Jacquot, the commander-in-chief of Indochina, Indochina they called it, "I want to give your bandmaster some cigars." He said, "That's fine." So the next time I went to his headquarters, I took a box of cigars and I gave them to the bandmaster and I told him to pass them around among those bandsmen and he did. Jacquot was over on the veranda watching me. He said, "I thought you wanted to give the bandmaster a cigar." I said, "Well, you know damn well I wouldn't be cheap enough to come over here with one cigar." Without a doubt Jacquot didn't like it because I gave his bandsmen cigars.

But, as a result of that, I send an aide-de-camp, an officer by the name of Jack [John M.] Shultz that now lives in Austin, over there with my tape recorder and got the bandmaster to record some of their Moroccan music. That tape right there on my shelf, "Foreign Legion Bands, 1956," about one half a reel, ends about graduation number thirty.

Well, I don't know how we got on the subject of the Foreign Legion, but anyhow, for example, [G. Frederick] Reinhardt --

G: Ambassador Reinhardt.

W: Ambassador Reinhardt, who was ambassador when I got there. He phoned me up one morning, he said, "There are tanks rolling down
behind my house going down to the river and being loaded on ships. Why don't you stop them?" I said, "Jacquot has got the bayonets, I haven't any troops." Well, it suddenly dawned on him that the man with the bayonets, by God, was the one who controlled. A lot of people don't realize that, that you get into a situation that way, any diplomacy goes to hell. The man who's got the soldiers and the bayonets is going to do what he wants to until he gets tired or until the bureaucracy can get around to making protests. But that quite surprised him. I told him, "You can't keep those people from loading on anything here that they want to take to France."

Mr. [John Foster] Dulles came to Saigon. He was coming up from Australia I remember and he sent me a wire, or sent me a cable before he got there, "Give me an invoice of American property issued to the French during such-and-such a period." Well, that was for three or four years, since 1954 certainly. I had no such records. Mike O'Daniel had no such records. I immediately went to Washington with a TWX and said, "Mr. Dulles is coming here, going to be here at such-and-such a time and he wants an invoice of the property the U.S. furnished the French. Will you send it immediately?" I got a reply back that said, "There's no such record in Washington. All we can do is give you the dollar amounts."

Anyway, when Mr. Dulles came in, I reported to him: "You asked for an invoice of property that we had furnished the French. We have no such invoice as that. Neither do your friends back in Washington have such a thing as that. Further, I can tell you
right now that the French are stealing us blind here in this place. They're taking out equipment that they have no authority to take out, and I have no means to stop them." He said, "What did you expect? Of course, they're going to steal you blind. They're going to take anything they can get their hands on. They have ships to haul it with. They're going to do it."

I sent a message back to Washington that the French were taking out more than they were supposed to. In other words, a decision had been made, between Washington and Paris that when the French forces evacuated South Vietnam that they would take out a certain amount of equipment and no more. In other words, they would take out a full TO & E [table of organization and equipment] for all the troops they had in Vietnam. I reported, "They're taking out much, much more than they have TO in troops here." They came back from Washington to me and said, "That's impossible. The French wouldn't break an agreement in that manner."

Several months later, after they had completely evacuated, the chief of MAAG in France sent a message to me as the chief of MAAG in Vietnam, "The warehouses here are full of equipment, military equipment from South Vietnam. Where are the records and how do I pick the equipment up on the French records here?" I send him back a message--I knew this officer although I don't remember now who it was--I replied, "That's impossible, because Washington told me the French wouldn't do a thing like that." But I also sent both messages back to Washington and said, "Here are the warehouses"—Jacquot had
boasted in the French newspapers that his warehouses were bulging with equipment that he had brought from South Vietnam—"Here is property theft that I told you about some time ago that you said was not happening at all." I heard not another word from anyone about it. Well, there's nothing anyone could have done about it at that date. It was an accomplished fact.

G: Let me ask you what your first impressions of President Diem were?

W: I don't remember my very first impressions. I don't remember. He was a very small man in stature. I say very small, I imagine Diem might have been five foot, one or two [inches], maybe not that tall, and inclined to be stout, portly. Always well dressed. That is, to this extent, he had an affinity for white sharkskin suits. He always wore a collar and tie, and his shoes were polished, his hands, nails and teeth were clean. His hair always well combed, his face hairless. He was a great talker. It was not unusual for him to have me sit down beside of him, and talk to me for one or two hours without ever stopping for a breath. His office was spartan as was his bedroom. An army cot, table and two chairs. Our conferences presented a problem that I was able to solve to a degree. I was able to get, at various times, different American officers who could speak French and at the same time someone who had enough military knowledge to know what we talked about and enough economic and political knowledge so what was said wasn't foreign to them. They would sit there, and every once in a while—initially I'd say, "Mr. President,
stop just a minute," and then I'd tell this man to tell me what the President was saying.

Then after I got to know him better, or he got to know me better, I suggested, "This is not going as well as it should because my memory is not as good as yours and I can't remember everything that you tell me here and all the problems we discuss. I've got a good interpreter, and I have him interrupt us occasionally. Why not just let him take notes and there will be no interruption, and then when we get back to my office we'll put his notes into a draft that I can read, so that I can know exactly all that was said." And he bought that.

Consequently, thereafter that was the method of operation. When I would get back to my headquarters and before the interpreter was able to get something on his mind that would divert his thought to something else, I had him sit down in my office and with the notes he had write out in longhand his concept of what had been said during the last two or three hours. I'm not exaggerating when I say two or three hours, because that was not uncommon. The same time he was doing that I was sitting there at my desk writing my version. In those days I had an excellent memory. We'd get through, he'd hand me his version and I'd take it and thank him and he'd go his way, and I'd take his draft and compare it to mine and I'd come up with what I thought was a reliable record of what had transpired. I became a great admirer of President Diem. I thought he was doing a wonderful job. He was simply outstanding and well informed. But I was in the minority as far as some local Americans were concerned.
I want to come to that a little later down the line, because I think you can speak to that point very well, and I have some questions I wanted to introduce along that line just a little further.

Do you remember any of the other young officers who became so prominent later on? Do you ever encounter people like [Nguyen] Khanh, for example, who took over I think sometime around December of 1963 after the coup in which Diem was assassinated.

I read part of something right here. We've been cleaning up my office here the last few days and I unearthed something here. Now you take a look at those papers and talk about Vietnamese officers. Now I don't have the file at my fingertips now, but before I left Vietnam I had compiled a roster of the Vietnamese military officers, the senior officers or officers that had key positions, and either written a brief about those officers, each one of them individually, or had the American officer that was most closely associated with him write a detailed brief of him. So I had a dossier on every officer that I thought outstanding in the Vietnamese forces, and as I recall I furnished a copy of that file to CINCPAC, and I kept a copy myself. I don't know where my copy is. I'm almost positive that I gave it to the U.S. Army Historical Section. But at that time, which was twenty-one years ago, I knew practically all these people and knew very closely where they came from and what they did, what their idiosyncracies were and how good they were or how bad they were.
I remember that when [Nguyen Van] Thieu became president that I referred back to that file—at that time it was on the shelf right over there in that corner—and the notation I made on Thieu, who I knew as a lieutenant colonel or colonel on the Headquarters Army Staff there in Saigon, I had stated, “This is the most efficient Vietnamese officer that I have met in Vietnam, and one that will probably go the highest.” And by God, he did, he became president.

G: So you were not surprised?

W: I was not surprised, no. I didn’t think Big Minh would ever become president, although later I think he wanted to be. I didn’t think he would, because he was too lazy and he wouldn’t take responsibility. I thought possibly Don would go high, Tran Van Don, but I wasn’t too sure. But Thieu, when I knew him was a staff officer on the Vietnamese general staff. I thought [he] was the smartest and most intelligent man I had ever came in contact with in Vietnam, Diem excepted of course.

Now there was one man that was pushing him very closely and his name was [Le Van] Kim. Kim was a French citizen and was married to General Don’s sister and had been an officer in the French regular army. When I wanted to get the [Vietnamese] military academy on its feet and going, Kim was the man I picked to do that job. At that time he was a colonel or a brigadier, I forget which. Did that answer your question?

G: Yes, sir, that’s exactly the kind of thing I was looking for. Do you remember [Nguyen Cao] Ky, or was he still a youngster?
I knew Ky, but not too well. He was a captain and an aviator. I'm not too sure that I ever had any conversations with Ky, but I saw him frequently because on occasions I went out to the headquarters of the paratroop brigade, the outfit that tried to pull a coup in November I think--

Of 1960.

--of late in 1960, yes. Ky invariably would be going here to there or passing some place near, and I always recognized him because he had very dark hair and his moustache. At that time he didn't have the flamboyant dress that he later affected, but I asked who he was and I remember being told his name. But if I ever had any detailed conversation with him, I don't recall. He had aroused my interest.

Now everybody, even Diem's enemies, credit him with being a scrupulously honest man. But were there problems with the corruption further down the line in the Vietnamese administration? Did you encounter problems this way?

I couldn't say that there was not. First of all, however I'll say that I would agree that Diem was scrupulously honest and had not only an honest, but I think a high moral character. How much corruption there was down the line I don't know, but I do know this, that on several occasions without any warning of any kind or anything of that nature, I would require American officers to appear at this pay table or that pay table when the Vietnamese were paying the troops. Or, with their interpreters, check records, and I never once found a Vietnamese officer who was padding his roster
to draw additional pay. Now they were always after more pay, no doubt about that, and I had several hard conversations with Diem about the army being top heavy with noncoms. They were not noncoms, they were people carrying noncom ratings and drawing that extra pay. But I never found any corruption as far as the Vietnamese military were concerned although I was looking for it all the time. That's normal precaution.

G: Did this apply to aid, their handling of American aid in those years as well?
W: To the best of my knowledge, yes.
G: Were you satisfied that we were able to keep track of how they administered the aid that we were giving?
W: The military aid, yes. Other aid that went through USOM [United States Operation Mission] no, I have no idea.
G: You have no acquaintance with that end of it?
W: No.
G: The military aid, that was okay?
W: Yes, absolutely.
G: What struck you as the problems that were bothering Diem the most at this time? What seemed to be on his mind?
W: He was just trying to build a country. Some thought he was working on a foundation of sand, and I think he knew it. He had a terrible time, I think, deciding who he could trust and who he could not trust. He placed great trust in me. Probably more than any other foreigner. Being a Vietnamese, of course, he was a very strong
family man, and that's the reason he relied so much on his brothers, because they were family and he thought he could trust them. But I'm sure that he was never sure whether he could trust anyone else or not. I'm not talking about his military so much now. I'm talking about the different things he would try to do in the legislature with his land reforms and his taxes and things of that nature.

G: Did you have much familiarity with those programs?

W: Yes.

G: They've come in for a lot of criticism after the fact. What was the problem with land reform as you could see it?

W: There was no problem, no problem at least to my mind there should have been no problem. First of all, a lot of those people over there—not a lot of them, but several of them owned large acreage, thousands of acres. He mentioned Tran Van Don here. His father was a doctor and had been an ambassador here, there and yonder, highly respected, a highly educated man. He owned thousands of acres down in the Delta. One of Diem's reforms was that no person could own more than a certain number of hectares, and I think it averaged down to no one could own more than two hundred or maybe two hundred and fifty acres of land. So that immediately threw the big landowners against him. Now the government didn't confiscate that land, but they decided what the fair value was and that's what the owner was paid and that was it. Then the government turned around and sold this land or gave it to the peasants. Thus many were no longer sharecroppers but small landowners. Well, you know, if you tried that right here in the United States
you see what you would run into. Say someone is going to decide
to break up Lyndon B. Johnson’s or other ranch holdings over here,
and then say one can have two hundred acres and no more. Well,
you know what that would raise. Well, that same thing happened
over there. The land barons were being divided [?].

He tried and did move people from unsettled and poor areas
into more prosperous areas and built small towns. I thought he was
doing a wonderful job. I thought if a man owned land he would fight
to defend it. As a sharecropper he probably wouldn’t.

G: Was this what they called the relocation program?
W: That’s right, yes. That was one name to it. Another one they called
something with a ville on the end of it.

G: Oh, agrovilles.

W: Agrovilles, yes. I thought that was wonderful, because not only
were these people brought into small villages, but then they could
go out from there to farm their nearby holdings, but the villages
were arranged so that there was a certain amount of ground behind
each house, maybe fifty feet wide. I’m guessing now, it makes no
difference. Say it’s fifty feet wide and a hundred feet long.
Each house had a little garden right there. The American embassy
objected to that. Why, I don’t know. They never explained to me
why they objected to it. They fought it tooth and nail.

I know that we had a discussion, Diem and I had a discussion
on this one time, on people doing various work for the state. He
said, “We’re supposed to pay for this work with taxes. Some of the
people can't pay taxes. "What's your solution in the United States?"
I said, "I don't know what the solution is in the United States
now but when I was a boy in Denton, Texas, in Denton County in North
Texas, when some taxes came due if a man couldn't pay his taxes, he
took his team of mules or his team of horses and his wagon and he
worked on county roads and he paid out his taxes that way. There
was no discredit to the rancher or the farmer who did that. It
was normal and hundreds of people did it, that's the way they paid
their taxes." "Well," he said, "I think that's all right," so he
started doing that over there. Well, Jesus Christ, you would be
surprised at the uproar that went on in the American embassy.
Because Diem was allowing some of these people to work and therefore
get credit for the tax, they were being made peons and slaves. Well,
there was no slavery about it. And in those country team meetings
I'd say, "Well, goodness gracious, they did that in Denton County,
Texas when I was a boy and no one said anything about slavery then.
I don't see anything wrong with it. It's honest work for an honest
debt." Well, they said, "You don't do things like that anymore."
And so that was it. Actually they were advocating welfare that the
U.S. would pay for.

Well, I don't know what their solution was, that is Diem's
solution, except that if the people couldn't pay taxes, then they
had no one to pay for this labor and so the labor wasn't performed
and so the agroville slowed to a halt. A Diem program was blocked
again. Maybe the embassy wanted the U.S. to foot the bill. Maybe
they were put out because they hadn't proposed the project themselves.

Now there were all kinds of arguments like that coming up and it really got to be very bad, very bad.

G: You mentioned the relocation program, and I'm a little puzzled. Was that supposed to be a social reform or were there military implications to that? Exactly what was Diem trying to do?

W: It was largely social.

G: It was?

W: Agricultural.

G: Now I'm speaking of the Highlands. Didn't he move some people into the Highlands?

W: Yes, he put some people up there, but I don't say that was necessarily military. I was quite in favor of it, because in that country there you had a series of tribes that are generally called Montagnards [tribes] or Môi. That's the [Vietnamese] word for savage. They weren't savage. They were not—oh, they might have been on the same life standards as American blanket Indian back in say 1800s or something like that, but I visited among them time and time again. They were very primitive. The women, oddly enough, wore skirts, but from the waist up they were completely naked. But the men wore jackets, but from the waist down, except for a jock strap, they were naked, reversed that way. No one seemed to think anything of it. They were migratory. They would go into an area and cut down the brush and the trees and plant their crop. Some of them were very industrious, and near some of their villages there would be any
number of what back here in Texas you'd call a corn crib. They had their produce stored up in those cribs. Now when they got ready to move they'd go to another place and first of all, after they cleared off as much brush as they wanted to, they burned the rest. I asked them why, and they said, "That's the way we get our fertilizer." I could communicate that much with them to find out what the hell they were burning this brush for. Well, to make the ground more fertile. Simple.

I was very strong for Diem putting as many people up on the borders as possible, because what I really wanted was a string of listening posts. I wanted a string of listening posts all up the Cambodia border and all the way up to Laos and on up to North Vietnam. I remember one time that I had that plan fixed up on a map for benefit of one of our officers that came down from CINCPAC, one of our admirals. When he looked at that he said, "Hell, you're building a Maginot Line." I said, "Look at the scale of that map. Those outposts are thirty miles apart." Too few Americans knew anything about Vietnam, the country or its people.

G: Were there any problems with that relocation program?
W: Yes, they had a lot of problems. Just exactly what the magnitude of the difficulties were [I don't know], but very few of those plans worked out completely because first of all, he had to fight the landlords. Then he had to fight the Americans and God knows what other political people that might be involved.

G: What Americans were against it?
W: The American embassy, representing the United States State Department as far as I could guess.

G: What was their objection?

W: I don't know. They never did explain to me. Why not let a man work out his taxes with his [labor] in one of those agrovilles? What's their objection? I don't know. You'll have to ask some liberal, bureaucratic character who thought welfare better than work.

G: Sounds like someone is not communicating.

W: That's right. There's no doubt about it. Or they suddenly say, that's slavery. I've heard people here in the U.S.--years ago--say when a person went down to one of those labor halls, they'd speak of going down to the slave centers. Why teach a people that welfare is better than honest work?

Tape 2 of 2

G: In line with what we've said about the relocation program, did Diem ever express to you any concern about the long frontier that he had with Cambodia and Laos?

W: Oh, yes. He was quite aware of that, and I was, too. That bothered him. I might bring in at this time--although it might be touched on later--but I brought up the question of hot pursuit. We were having so much trouble--I keep saying we, because it was as much MAAG's problem as it was a Vietnamese problem--with Cambodia. They would come over the border and raid these Vietnamese villages. I know they did because I could go and visit the villages after the attacks.
These were Cambodian troops?

Yes, or as far as I know just outlaws, because by the time I could get there they were gone. There would be a fight, a short little fire fight. They'd attack these villages, burn up what they could, shoot up this and that and the other and then jump back across the border real fast. I suggested to Diem that he have an arrangement with Prince [Norodom] Sihanouk of Cambodia for the privilege of hot pursuit. Well, Diem didn't know what the term hot pursuit was, and I used as an example the agreements between the United States and Mexico, which led eventually to General Jack Pershing going across the border looking for Pancho Villa. I said, "We would never have accomplished that if Mexico hadn't given us the privilege of going in there when we were hot on a bandit's trail. Of course if the Mexicans were hot on a bandit's trail they could come into New Mexico, Texas or wherever they wanted to. But usually it was the other way around, and it ended up with Jack Pershing going into Mexico." He said, "We can't do that with the Cambodians because I've discussed a plan of that nature with Sihanouk, and he won't have anything to do with it."

He said, "You know, there's a great rivalry between the Cambodians--hostility, too--and the Vietnamese," and he told me something about history that I didn't know. Later I read and studied it. But in years gone by--and I'm talking about plenty of years gone by--the Vietnamese conquered Cambodia and exacted tribute from them. They kept an occupation force in Phnom Penh for years,
maybe fifty, a hundred years, something like that. And the Cambodians became so used to it—this was Diem's statement—that eventually the only Vietnamese that stayed there were not troops, but merely the Vietnamese agent, this day and time you'd call him ambassador. The Cambodians paid him tribute each year and he sent it over to Vietnam. He said, "That's the hostile relationship between Vietnam and Cambodia. I haven't been able to improve that relationship although I have tried."

Now with Laos it was something else. I found here the other day a paper that is a proposed agreement with Laos for hot pursuit, and I think I wrote it, but I'm not sure. By anyway, it was one of the things that Diem and I discussed. He was very much in favor of one member of the royalty in Laos. They had a royal family in Laos, and there were arguments between members of that family. He favored a certain part of that family, a certain branch of that family. And actually, a prince came down to Saigon one time and I was invited to the Palace to meet him. I was amazed when I met him because I'll bet you that man stood six-six if he stood an inch, and weighed about two hundred and fifty or two hundred and seventy-five pounds. When you remember that most Vietnamese and Laotians are people that stretch it to weigh a hundred to a hundred and ten pounds, you can see...

But anyway, Diem was very knowledgeable of that border and worked with me in many ways in trying to secure it. I thought so much about it that one time I got in the group with Reinhardt and a couple more people and made necessary hunting arrangements. Got
on elephants and went up and rode that Cambodian and Laotian border
an awful long ways under the guise of hunting. Reinhardt wasn't
under the guise, he was actually hunting. I was under the guise of
hunting. I went up there to see what the terrain, trails and streams
were like. I had a good plan prepared that comes into road building.
I wanted a road that would go from the east coast across Vietnam,
across Laos, into Thailand and on down to Bangkok. I wanted a good
highway through there so that if and when we started fighting that
we would have this lateral behind us for supply purposes. But I
was blocked on that. Diem was blocked on that. Laos agreed.

G: What was the objection to that?
W: I don't know. Diem was for it, the Vietnamese were for it, MAAG
was for it. USOM and the embassy were against it. "Some of the roads
that--well, they wouldn't come out and say, "We're not going to do
this." But they'd volunteer to take over certain sections of the
roads to build. They were going to do that with USOM funds. They'd
never get their sections done. They'd never do it. Finally I'd go
in there in desperation and try to finish the job myself with army
engineers, that is, Vietnamese army engineers. From the day I went
out there until the day I left, I thought we might have to fight,
and I thought we could fight and win but I didn't think we would
need American infantry to do it. Some U.S. Air Force and some U.S.
Navy, maybe.
G: In connection with this security problem down along the border, did the Vietnamese attempt to enlist the Montagnards who were already sparsely up in that area?

W: Yes. But the Vietnamese military told me they couldn't rely on the Montagnards, and I could understand that because the Montagnards couldn't rely on the Vietnamese. I remember General Ty, the chief of staff, told me, "They can't stand artillery fire." "Well," I said, "you know, I think that's particularly unusual because you've got one company in the Vietnamese army that's made up entirely of Montagnards and that's a trench mortar company." They call them trench mortar, I'd call them 4.2's or 81's. I don't think General Ty ever knew that he had such a company.

The French considered those people savages and that's where they got their name. Diem said that the French priests, Catholic priests, were preaching sedition among them and he issued an edict there at one time that no French Catholic priest nor American minister of any kind could go into the Montagnard area without specific passports from the secretary of defense. The Americans were sending over large amounts at different times of material for destitute people, mostly clothing and things of that nature. That project was handled by church people, not by MAAG. We had a few American protestant ministers over there, missionaries. And there were Catholic priests there. And they may have had some French Protestant preachers, I don't know. But the charity was under agreement. Church organizations assembled all the clothing, blankets, et cetera in
warehouses in Saigon, and then because the French priests had penetrated the Highlands better than anyone else, they turned the disposition of it over to the French priests. Diem complained bitterly to me about that arrangement. He said, "The American people think that's going to the Montagnards and so forth as presents from American people. It's not. These priests are taking it in there and either saying so directly maybe, but the implication is that all this aid is coming from France. If you ask any Montagnard that's got on an American sweater or a coat, 'Where did you get this?' he'll say, 'From France.'" Diem said, "That's wrong. You ought to get that changed." I could not.

I took the matter up with the embassy but they weren't interested in it, and I had bigger problems and so I never did anything else about that other than to discuss it with a couple of American missionaries. The system did not change.

G: Was there an ethnic problem between the Vietnamese people and the Montagnards? Was that part of it?

H: Yes, definitely. That whole country over there as I knew it was divided into classes. Some examples: One night at a lawn party at the French embassy, a hundred people present, men and women, Vietnamese and French and some Americans, I was standing off by myself when I saw a Vietnamese army officer nearby that I knew and knew he could speak a certain amount of English, and so I engaged him in conversation. I said, "You know it seems odd to me that everyone here is speaking French. I don't hear any Vietnamese spoken at all,
and certainly a third of these people here are Vietnamese." "Well," he said, "you can't expect anyone here to speak Vietnamese. If one of these Frenchmen speaks Vietnamese, he loses face immediately in the eyes of other Frenchmen because he knows how to speak our language." I said, "You couldn't be serious." He said, "I'm very serious. It would not be popular for a Frenchman to be known as to be able to converse in Vietnamese."

One time I was talking to a Vietnamese general. I asked what some Vietnamese soldier had said in our presence. He took me to one side, he said, "General Williams, you know, I don't understand Vietnamese." I said, "You don't speak Vietnamese?" He said, "No, sir. I was born and raised in France, and I was educated in France. I can't speak this language." I said, "Well, goddamn it, you're wearing stars in the Vietnamese army! Why don't you learn?" He said, "Yes, sir." I doubt if he did.

I was driving with a Vietnamese general one time going to his corps headquarters. I was always trying to find some way to improve their mobility. We were accused by certain American writers of trying to make the Vietnamese army over into an American type army, where everything was done in trucks. Well, that charge was not true at all. They had a method of carrying food, water, soil, any load, in baskets. You very likely saw it yourself in your time over there. They'd put a loaded basket on one end of a pole and a loaded basket on the other end of the pole, put the pole on their shoulder and they'd go down the road with their load. Those little old women
and men would go along there at almost a trot and they'd go like everything. They could cover distance. So I said to this general beside of me, "Is it easier to carry the same number of pounds of whatever you're carrying with two baskets on a pole, or to carry it some other way." He said, "I don't know." I said, "Surely you must have some idea." He looked at me and said, "General, I never had one of those poles on my shoulder in my life." In other words, "what the hell, do you think I'm a black goddamn nigger or something like that?"

That was that officer's attitude.

Now, Diem decided that he wanted to get the Vietnamese of Saigon to know something about the Montagnards other than what they had known before so he decided to have a big reception and party. He invited any number of Montagnards down from the hills to an open outdoor banquet on the Palace grounds or what they called the Palace grounds. The Palace really was just a big building; it wasn't no more a palace than this house is a palace, but it was known as the Presidential Palace.

They had the food and drink all laid out on tables and he had a lot of guests present: French, Americans and so on and so forth, American military, French military, American civilians, French civilians, the diplomatic corps. Then the Montagnards arrived. They came through the big front gate of the Palace grounds. They dismounted from whatever vehicles that had been used to bring them down from the hills and they walked down past the Palace, down to where the banquet tables were laid out. What we'd call a big picnic where people would
go up to tables and help themselves. They walked down through the party guests. They were dressed up, they thought, the best they could possibly be dressed up, and some of their costumes were rather picturesque. Of that whole damn group, French, American officers, American civilians, French civilians, Vietnamese civilians, there were only two men who stepped out and met those people or shook hands with them and said hello, and one of them was Ngo Dinh Diem and the other was Sam Williams. The local people stood around and stared at those mountain people like they were animals out of a zoo. I had visited most of the chiefs in their villages. Common courtesy required me to speak to them and I did.

The Montagnards were not that bad, I can assure you. I've gone up into their villages, I've also gone up in their villages with President Diem. I preferred to go with him more than anyone else, because he didn't mind going into the villages and talking with these people. If with a Vietnamese officer, he was liable to, hell, cuff one of them or something like that, arrogant as hell, because the mountain people were in their opinion much lower.

Now you ask about the ethnic divisions, there they were. Now here's one officer that says "I can't speak the Vietnamese language." Another officer says "I never had one of those carrying poles on my shoulder in my life." Then you see this at the reception for the whole group to Montagnards. Sure, it went straight through.

G: The great distance between officer corps and everybody else.
W: Yes. European style. Now, here's where they started having trouble, almost having trouble. They had one division they called the Nung, N-U-N-G, Division, it was the 3rd. That division was recruited by the French several years before on the borders between North Vietnam and China. They were mountaineers and some of the best soldiers I ever saw. They moved them down to South Vietnam and the French positioned them, and they were in position when I got there. Going out of Saigon as though you were going north to Hanoi, shortly before you came to Cam Ranh Bay, that's where the Dung 1 position was.

A colonel, a Nung colonel, commanded that division and he had French-Vietnamese dual citizenship. Diem wanted him to take Vietnamese citizenship only but he wouldn't. I visited him frequently. I liked him, I liked his wife. They served an awful good table and the food hotter than you can buy in Austin or San Antonio. Oh, it would burn you up, but it was good. I said, "Why don't you take Vietnamese citizenship? What would it hurt?" He said, "The French have told me I would lose my pension. I'm almost ready to retire." There was his official reason. Renounce French citizenship and you lose your pension.

Diem and his people became nervous because of these Nungs. They wanted to infiltrate them. They decided that they would do it through the division signal company. So they sent in some enlisted men, Vietnamese enlisted men. Radio and telephone men, and assigned them to this Dung division signal company. Then they also sent in some Vietnamese officers who were top notch, as well as they had, signal
officers, to run telephones, radio and so on and so forth.

Now one day in an inspection of some kind, one of these Vietnamese officers was going through this signal company, which was predominately Nung, and he slapped a Nung soldier for some reason which to him was perfectly all right, because officers had done it in the Vietnamese army, they had seen the French do it to their soldiers and their own. But boy, they had an awakening right there. The soldiers grabbed the Vietnamese lieutenant and those people know rough ways to treat a prisoner. They had out in those divisions cages. If you looked close enough you'd see these wire cages, just about the size of a good dog house. A man can't stand up, he can't lie down, he can't sit down, nothing. They're made out of barbed wire. So when I got wind of this thing, they already had this Vietnamese lieutenant in one of these barbed wire cages and then had turned the whole thing over to the commanding colonel of the Nung division.

Diem said, "They haven't had discipline." I said, "Wait just a minute. They've got plenty of discipline. Your officers have got to stop, your officers have got to stop slapping people. You can't do that at all." He said, "I agree." I said, "All right. That Vietnamese officer slapped a Nung soldier standing in ranks. In the American army an officer cannot hit a soldier. Nor can a soldier hit an officer, because if either one of them should do that, the other one is going to be in an awful jam. That's the only way you can work this military business and you've got to teach your people, and make your people believe that." Well, Diem didn't argue with that, he
agreed, but what could he do? You can't change customs like that in one generation; it's going to take some time to change things of that nature. However he did stop use of rickshaws overnight. It was degrading for a human to pull a rickshaw. Yes, they had ethnic problems.

G: How did that relocation program finally work out, or was it still going on when you left?

W: It was going on when I left.

G: Continuing problems with it?

W: Same thing. I don't think they ever found a solution. They weren't getting adequate support. The Vietnamese were going to have to have some financial support from USOM, even if it was no more than--well, I don't know enough about that to talk to--maybe no more than seed rice for planting their crops or something of that nature.

G: But you attribute the problem to lack of support primarily?

W: Yes. American economic support.

G: Let's deal with what was primarily your bailiwick over there, the Vietnamese military organizations. I presume you had a good deal to do with their training and so on. Did Diem distinguish between an external and an internal threat to security at that time? Or did you?

W: I don't know whether he did or not. Now if I understand, when you say internal threat, you mean an uprising of Viet Cong, for example?

G: I don't mean to look at it through the glasses that we're wearing now, because we know what happened later on. But there was organizations formed early to keep security internally. Like the Civil
Guard, for example. What was the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps supposed to do? What was their role?

W: The Civil Guard in theory roughly could be compared to the National Guard in the United States. The Self-Defense Force was maybe what you'd call state militia. There's a difference. Neither of them were functional because they didn't have the leadership nor the means to function. They didn't have the training, they didn't have anyone to direct their training. They were not a MAAG problem because MAAG was told repeatedly by the embassy to keep hands off completely in the Defense Corps and the Civil Guard organizations' equipment and training.

G: Well, whose problem were they?

W: USOM. USOM sent back to the States and had police people, University of Michigan I believe, but I'm not sure, come over and they were supposed to train them.

G: Michigan State in fact.

W: I remember distinctly that—well, as an individual and as chief of MAAG I had quite a bit of argument repeatedly about the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps, very serious. Because—well, primarily: the Civil Guard was untrained, Self-Defense Corps was untrained. Their weapons were no good. Some of them were carrying old French rifles that the Vietnamese called fishing poles. I've picked them up and had them fall apart in my hands, actually physically had rifles fall apart in my hands when I'd take them from a man, take them up like that to inspect them. They'd put a detachment, say a
platoon, what we'd call a platoon, out to guard a bridge or something of that nature.

6: Let me interrupt you just a second, General. Who were they guarding it from?

W: Any outlaws or anyone--actually, what they were doing mostly was giving them jobs, I thought. But there was a certain amount of outlaws there and what they call Viet Cong gangs and so forth that would try to disturb things. Of course the Vietnamese guards would move in around this bridge with their wives and children and they'd set up their little hootches and things like that. Now, we'll say that twenty, thirty of them were there, of the Civil Guard or the Self-Defense Corps. This would happen for instance. Maybe half a dozen hard-core Viet Cong would come to a nearby village and demand, "All right, everybody out." They'd get them out, they'd form up. "Now we're going to march up such-and-such a place and you're going to holler and yell." So they would, Viet Cong in front. Now these poor bastards guarding this bridge for instance, we'll just take that as a hypothetical situation, here is this multitude in the dark. The leading Viet Cong comes up and demands: "We're here. We've got so many fighters. We can surround you in a minute. It's either life or death. Surrender immediately or you've had it." And they had all this shouting and so forth. These poor people in these hootches at this bridge, they hear maybe two hundred people back here shouting and yelling. They have no discipline, they have no weapons that's worth fighting with and so forth, they see themselves as heavily
outnumbered and they give up.

Okay. Now where does MAAG enter into that? I say when that happens, it causes the people to lose confidence in the government, because the government had put the people there to guard a bridge and they can't guard that bridge from a half a dozen Viet Cong, although the government had maybe forty or fifty men there. So any time that happens it weakens the government that much. I don't want the government to be weakened. I want these Civil Guards and Self-Defense Corps to be so strong and so well trained that they can fight and resist anything like that. And if they fight the half a dozen Viet Cong are going to fade back into the brush. That briefly was my interest in the problem.

Now, those discussions became serious and heated.

G: At what point was this beginning to become a problem? Was this a problem right from the earliest days?

W: I'd say by 1957.

G: That early?

W: When did Mr. [Elbridge] Durbrow come over? He came over in April of 1957. Well, it was during his regime that most of this started and became progressively worse.

USOM brought a man over to Saigon and he appeared at a country team meeting one time. You're familiar with the country team? That's a group made up of the heads of the various sections: the head of the USOM, the head of USIA, and the head of MAAG and the ambassador and so forth. I was introduced to this man as Chief so-and-so and
he said his job was or was introduced to me as the man who was training the Civil Guard and police, a dual job, in South Vietnam. He seemed like a nice sort of fellow, maybe in his fifties, and friendly. I said, "You've been in police work a long time?" He said, "Yes, I have," and I think he told me he'd been in the police business ten or fifteen years. I said, "They call you chief. Were you chief of police?" He said, "Yes, sir." I said, "Where?" He said, "Detroit." Well, that made quite an impression on me because the ex-chief of police of Detroit must be a pretty reliable man. Now it wasn't till a long time after I found out there's more than one Detroit in the United States, and he wasn't from the Detroit, Michigan that I knew about. Now that man was flying under false colors with me.

I wanted USOM to arm the Civil Guard with decent weapons. This Chief said, "They don't need any more arms. The only thing we need is one revolver per man. These people will be taught marksmanship to such an extent that every time a shot is fired an outlaw drops dead." Now this was a serious discussion, just like we're having here now. I asked, "Were you in any gunfights when you were chief of police of Detroit?" He said, "No, sir. I never had to draw my gun." I should have wised up right then. I said, "Have you been in any gunfights since you've been in South Vietnam?" He said, "Why, no." I said, "Have you ever been out in the boondocks here, out in the countryside when the Vietnamese and the outlaws were shooting at each other?" "No, sir." I said, "Well, if you're going
down a road in your jeep and a half a dozen men from either side of
the road start shooting at you with rifles or throwing grenades, are
you going to be able to handle that situation with a six-shooter?"
"My every shot will be a dead man." (Laughter) And you know, every-
one on the country team believed that man. Everyone believed that man!

G: Well, his concept of the Civil Guard was a police force.
W: Exactly. A city or village policeman.
G: And your concept was more of a military.
W: That's right, that's right.
G: Was that the heart of the--
W: That was the heart of the whole business. Now, these differences
were no secret. The chief of staff of the American army knew of
them. Mr. Brucker, who was secretary of the army, he knew about
the problems. His deputy had come out there repeatedly, they all
knew about this thing going on. One day someone told me, "There's
two thousand Tommy guns in Japan"--or Okinawa, it makes no difference--
"that have been declared surplus. You can get them free. Do you want
them." They said, "All right, you've got them." And so eventually
they shipped me two thousand Tommy guns, 45 caliber, the whole thing.
Spare parts, magazines and a certain number of rounds, two or three
thousand rounds per gun. Shipped those to me at Saigon. CINCPAC
knew about this. I told CINCPAC I was going to issue these to the
Civil Guard, and he directed: "Don't do it all at one time. Issue
them in small groups and see that the people are trained to handle
them before you turn them loose."
Wouldn't USOM object to this?

Up until now they hadn't objected. When I asked the USOM director to request these weapons before I did, I said, "They're there. All you have to do is ask for them. They're your babies. You ask for them."

He said, "I'm not sure we want the Civil Guard to have those weapons."

Now that was his answer, and that's the last answer I ever got from him. So I said to myself, to hell with that, I haven't got time to play with that kind of a ball game. So I immediately asked for them myself and got them for free.

All right. Then I said to USOM, "We've got these weapons. Will you order in two hundred Civil Guard people at one time for one week's instruction under MAAG officers, to be instructed in the use of these Tommy guns?" He agreed, and he did. Now, as a precaution, I had a list made of the serial number of every one of those guns, because if something was going to come up about it or some captured they'd say, "All right, it was your fault." I'd say, "What's the number on that captured weapon?" Whether that would have done any good or not, I don't know.

So that way we distributed two thousand Tommy guns to the Civil Guard. Now after it was over, Mr. Durbrow, who at that time was the ambassador, took me to task. He said, "Why in the world did you issue those weapons to the Vietnamese?" Well, I said, "For a simple reason and you know why I did it. We've talked about this at the country team meetings, about these weapons being available. USOM was going to get them, they didn't get them, so I went and got
them." He said, "Yes, but if we'd held it off, I could have held these up as a carrot to Diem, and then got some favor in return."

Well, I said, "That's too late now. What we get in return is some efficiency out of the Civil Guard, maybe. Certainly not some personal favor."

G: Did he ever say what he wanted out of Diem?

W: No, no, didn't. And I doubt if he had any particular thing in his mind. But I had interest in the Civil Guard, but up until the day I left there I never was able to get any decent training done in the Civil Guard nor any adequate training done in the Defense Corps. Now, some people have said much later, well, the Vietnamese didn't want good training or equipment because they were afraid for all these people to have decent weapons. That was not true. It certainly was not true as far as the secretary of defense was concerned, the Vietnamese secretary of defense, the secretary to the presidency, or Diem, or Mr. [Ngo Dinh] Nhu. None of those people offered any objection at all to the Civil Guard or the Defense Corps having individual weapons. In fact they wanted them. Also they wanted them under MAAG for training.

G: Did any of the ARVN officers express an opinion on that?

W: No. Not on the Tommy guns. They expressed no adverse opinion on it. Of course, a lot of them said—not a lot of them, but it was hinted later, "Well, General, why didn't you give us those Tommy guns?"

"Well," I said, "your TO & E doesn't call for them."
G: The reason I ask is that one former USOM official has advanced the claim that Diem was creating a counterweight to disloyal army units with the Civil Guard.

W: I've heard that. I've heard that.

G: Would you put any credence in that?

W: No. None whatsoever. Because the Civil Guard was in such a pitiful condition that even though the army was not at that time an A-1 army by any manner or means, the Civil Guard couldn't have offered any competition to them at all. By 1957 the army was making good progress.

G: You have hinted several times that relations between Diem and USOM, or Diem and the Ambassador, were not everything they should have been. Is that correct?

W: That's my positive opinion, yes.

G: Was that a constant or did that situation build?

W: I'd say it built.

G: What was behind that?

W: I'm not too sure. When Mr. Reinhardt was ambassador, relationships all around were excellent, and within the country team they were excellent. But after Mr. Durbrow came, maybe we were all at fault to some extent. Friction developed. I was trying very hard and I thought it was in the United States' interest to get South Vietnam built up into a strong nation as fast as possible. I used to tell any Vietnamese who had any questions about it, 'If you've been told by the French or others that we're just swapping hats, that the French left and Americans come in? That's not so. The quicker we
Williams -- I -- 66

can get this job done, the quicker we are going to get out." I made that remark before a Senate committee one time. One of those senators said, "Well, General, what you're trying to do is work yourself out of a job?" I said, "That's exactly what I'm trying to do."

G: Were those the hearings in the summer of 1959, the [Albert] Colegrove business?

W: I think that was the Mansfield Committee. I'm sure it was.

G: Some people have accused I guess the Self-Defense Corps, that was the Dan Ve, wasn't it, wasn't that called the Dan Ve?

W: I don't remember.

G: I don't speak Vietnamese, so I'm on shaky ground--that they were often guilty of misbehaving in the villages, stealing ducks or chickens or arrogant behavior or so forth. Was that a common thing or did it happen at all in your tenure, or did you hear of it at all?

W: I'm sure it must have happened, but right now I can't remember a single incident of that kind ever being brought to my attention.

G: So it wasn't a problem so far as you knew?

W: No.

G: Where was Diem getting leaders for all of these organizations?

W: I'd say he was having an awful hard time. He was scratching.

G: Where did he get officers for the Civil Guard, for example?

W: I don't know. I know that the leaders of the Civil Guard, the commanding general of the Civil Guard, was normally an army officer.

G: Did army officers take lesser slots in that as well?
W: Probably.

G: The reason I'm asking is that once again, a former USOM official has said one of the problems with the army was that Diem was using army officers for lots of other things besides being in the army.

W: Oh, he did, there's no doubt about that. He used them for many things: overseeing construction work, overseeing the building of villages and overseeing the building of roads and things like that. We do it here in the United States to a degree. Most of it is done by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as you know.

Which brings up another thing that I just happened to think about. We had to have an airfield at Tan Son Nhut. The airfield we had there was not big enough to even take care of the planes we were then using. We had a wonderful chance there to get a field, and I wanted a field that's not less than two thousand feet long.

G: What was significant about two thousand yards?

W: I wanted it big enough for a four-engine bomber to come in and land on it. No one objected to that particularly. I don't think anyone thought about it. They didn't think, "what does General Williams want two thousand feet for, anyway?" But they argued about who they'd give the contract to. Okay, now I spoke about the army engineers a while ago. The American Navy takes on jobs like that, which I didn't know prior to that. So the American Navy sent out a couple of captains in civilian clothes, I guess they were naval engineers. They looked over the thing. And the United States Navy put in a bid for that job.
G: How can they do that?
W: I don’t know what the authority is; just like the Corps of Engineers can go down here and put in a bid, I guess for building a dam. But nevertheless, it was done. Now, that was a very good bid and I was very much in favor of it because I thought we could trust the American Navy to do the job we wanted done. Incidentally, along about that time I couldn’t get any air force officer of any stature to back me up on my desire for a long landing strip.

G: Why was that?
W: I don’t know. Whether they didn’t have the foresight to see that they were going to use bombers in there one day that would require that kind of runway or not, I don’t know.

G: Were they saying that what you had was adequate? Was that their position?
W: No, but they wanted me to agree to take something less. Well, anyway, when the discussion [arose] at the country team about that, the USO9 director said, “Well, we can’t have a bunch of sailors running around out there with their sailor suits and so forth. Why, the communists will know immediately that that is going to be for military purposes.” I said, “Didn’t these naval officers explain what they did?” “Well, I don’t remember.” I said, “If the Navy Engineers got the job, you’re not going to see anyone in navy uniform around that place. Those officers you talked to were here in civilian clothes. The people that they employ, whether they’re Americans or local labor, and they’ll employ both, will be in civilian clothes. You can’t
Williams -- I -- 69

tell that from any civilian project except it will be done better and you can depend on it." I don't know whether there was any hanky-panky in there or not, but the company that got the contract for that was not the United States Navy and it cost a hell of a lot more than the United States Navy bid on it. But those are the problems that I ran into.

Now for instance, we were building a highway from Saigon, going up north, and there were places on that highway that were going to be straight as an arrow. Now USOM was building this highway. It was not a military highway presumably. I said, "Now from this place here, certain kilometer, up to a certain kilometer, you've got a straight stretch. Let's make this highway four lanes from Saigon at least out that far or a little further, and let's put a little bit heavier base on that section." "What for? What do you want to do that for?" I said, "I want airplanes to be able to land on that. Did you ever hear about German planes landing on the autobahns in Germany during World War II?" "No. They did that?" You have an awful time convincing people if they're not informed about things. But that suggestion didn't work either. There was a good chance. I wasn't there after the war started, but all those airfields they had to build and those big things they did with the air force out there, lots of that could have been done beforehand, well beforehand, and certainly at much less cost than it was later. But you've got to work with people who have a little foresight to do things like that and to get things done.
G: Did the South Vietnamese army suffer from losing too many officers to all these various and sundry projects that Diem had going on? Was the leadership diluted more than it should have been?
W: I doubt it.
G: Speaking of officers, how did Diem select the top officers?
W: I don't know for sure. I think he took them more or less in order of the rank they had held in the French colonial army. He told me he selected Lieutenant General Ty as commander because he was the senior Vietnamese officer, a major I believe.
G: There are allegations that he placed too much reliance on personal loyalty and not enough on efficiency. Did you ever make a recommendation for promotion and run into that problem?
W: Well, I can't deny that he put a great deal of faith in the personal loyalty, but I can't say that I could ever cite an instance in which he put a less efficient officer into assignment because he thought that officer was loyal to him and some other officer wasn't.
G: So if this happened at all, it didn't happen during your time?
W: It could have happened in my time, but I don't believe it did. But you know, you can't tell, you can't tell what goes on in a man's mind.
G: Did he consult you about high appointments in the ARVN?
W: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.
G: Was your advice pretty well heeded, do you think?
W: Yes. Except in one instance I brought up here a while ago, in the case of General Xuan, X-U-A-N, I don't think I'm pronouncing that right. I suggested Xuan for such and such assignment and he said,
"I haven't got complete trust." And you know he was right in that lack of trust because it turned out that he was the officer that Big Minh sent to Cholon to pick up President Diem and his brother and bring them back to his headquarters. They were executed en route. Xuan was head of that convoy. So Diem had been right all that time. They never have decided who pulled that trigger, have they? Did you know? Oh, I think so, I think so. [Tram Van] Don says so in his book [Our Endless War Inside Vietnam]. There's no doubt in my mind who did it. However, I think that all of them were equally responsible regardless of who pulled the trigger. I think Big Minh ordered it, Don insists that he didn't know anything about it. There were about twelve of those officers in that coup and we know they were being monitored by a CIA man by the name of [Lou] Conein. Conein has stated publicly in the United States that he was in constant communication with Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge while the coup was going on, and advising Lodge what they were doing and what they were going to do, and so on and so forth.

Well anyway, when Diem phoned in from Cholon into the headquarters and told them that he was ready to surrender, they promised him they'd send him out of the country. Big Minh sent Xuan, in command of the detail, to go get them and send an armored personnel carrier to bring them back. I don't know where the word came out, but Diem and his brother were suspicious when they came for them and locked them in the back of a personnel carrier instead of an automobile. Then
initially the escort claimed they came to a railroad track and had to stop, and then that sometime while they were stopped some persons unbeknown got out of the convoy and went in there and killed President Diem and Mr. Nhu.

But that's not the true story at all in my mind. Xuan knew about the murder because Don states that when Xuan came back he was in the room with Big Minh when Xuan came in and reported: "The job is done," period. Don, thinking that they had the prisoners there, went out and over to another part of the compound where they were to fix up quarters for Diem and his brother, and when he came back he learned they were dead. The brother had been shot and cut up terribly, Diem had been shot and stabbed a couple of times, they were dead. There's no doubt in my mind about it but that Xuan knew of the murders and had honchoed the crime. I, from a personal point of view, held all of the generals that were present or members of the coup responsible for it.

G: Well, they undoubtedly had agreed on what was going to happen.

W: I don't know if they did or not. Maybe Big Minh might have taken the murders on himself, but I doubt it, but whether he did or not, I say the others are responsible just as much as he is. Of course, his aide charged with the murders then committed suicide. Now whether he committed suicide or Big Minh had him killed, I don't know. They found him hanging in his cell. Of course, they had first locked him up and then they found him hanging in the cell. I would say it's highly probable that Big Minh had that done, maybe did it
personally, as he was such a big, powerful man physically, maybe he wanted to be damn sure that this aide de camp didn't talk. I wouldn't put it past him at all. But anyway, as a result of that, I broke off all correspondence with the Vietnamese.

G: We hear a lot of criticism after the fact that we were training the Vietnamese for the wrong war. I would like to ask you, was there any criticism at the time of the way we were training the South Vietnamese army?

W: While I was there, there was none except occasionally there would be an article by some newspaper reporter or stringer that would write that we were building a Vietnamese army in the image of the American army and that was the wrong way to do it. Those people didn't know what they were talking about. Now I'll tell you exactly what we did as far as organizing the Vietnamese army. First of all, over a period of time, the Americans had been putting in for supplies, rifles, machine guns, whatnot and so on and so forth, and the requisitions were being honored back in the United States. The word came to me, orders came to me, that we had to have an approved table of organization and equipment and we would therefore requisition against that, nothing else. So that meant that immediately the Vietnamese had to have a table of organization and equipment, which up until that time, believe it or not, they had never had.

They had so many light divisions, so many heavy divisions, so-called, and units like that. So, it was decided that we would build a type [of] Vietnamese division. I had long conferences with Diem and with the Vietnamese senior officers. I said, "Now what we want to do is to get a Vietnamese division. You don't want a Japanese division
nor an American division nor a German division nor a French division. You need a division that is built to work in this country, in swamps, mountains, jungles, that's the kind of division you need." All agreed.

So we started working on it. They appointed a board and we worked with that board for an awful long time and we finally came to a consensus, and it wasn't easy and there was draft after draft. We started in from the rifle squad right on up, or the artillery crew right on up, see, the mortar crews, building right up from the bottom. And all to take advantage of the characteristics of the Vietnamese people and the terrain on which this army would be used. Finally after we got an agreement between the Vietnamese and MAAG on a table of operations we turned it in, as approved by the Vietnamese government. We sent it to Washington through CINCPAC. Washington then approved the TO & E's and that's what thereafter we requisitioned against. That's what we paid the troops on. I spoke a while ago about Diem being perturbed because we had reduced the number of noncons. Instead of having, say, umpty-ump numbers of corporals, we had a lesser number, according to how many squads they were going to command and things of that nature. There was no padding.

Now where these stringers got their ideas was this: Any time the Vietnamese had a parade or anything like that in the streets of Saigon, they had an idea that the more vehicles, the more armor or the more heavy material they could show in that parade, the better it would look to the world. Okay, you see a man come in there and he's a reporter from the Philippines or Japan or someplace and he sees
one of their parades, he says, "Mother of God, look at all that equipment coming down the street. Everyone is riding in a two-and-a-half ton truck or a jeep. Look at all that stuff. MAAG must be crazy. Those people can't work that in the jungle."

These photographs here, which I'll show you and describe them, these are some of the things that we tried to do. Now the Vietnamese are crazy about bicycles, and they use them all the time. So this vehicle you see here is a bicycle wheel under a frame that would normally look like an ordinary stretcher. All right, now there's their packs and their equipment on that frame. A man in front, a man behind that frame, but the weight's on this bicycle, and there they go. All right, that's one thing we used.

Pontoon bridges. We didn't have use for American-type pontoon bridges nor did we have them. Those people are used to using the normal growth there, so here we're showing how to build local pontoon bridges. You don't have to carry those or very little of them in any wagon train, because you haven't got one. You can actually build pontoon bridges on the spot. Here's where we take shelter halves and put them together and make rafts and use those for boats. There's another example of it right here.

Here's some more of these pictures showing how sometimes we would use two wheels instead of one wheel under one of those stretcher frames.

Here's where we tried pack animals—we had some horses over there, but not military, but we tried to use some horses as pack animals to see how it would work, but it didn't work at all.
G: What was wrong with the horses?
W: Climate. You see there a raft made out of inverted helmet liners. Another type of raft—we were doing all kind of experimenting like that. Here's people stripped down to their shorts because they're going to do some work out there in the river with their rafts.

G: The point of all this of course is that you were using indigenous materials?
W: And materials that the people had been used to working with. Here rafts are made out of shelter halves. Soldiers crossing rivers on ropes and so forth. This is the stuff that the anti-Vietnamese and pro-communists who were writing about the parades in Saigon never saw or heard of. They said, "Well, goodness gracious, MAAG is building an armored force in Vietnam." He weren't going anything of the kind. People read that trash and believed it.

G: Were there other representatives of Western allies, military representatives of Western allies, in Saigon at this time? Did they have any input into all of this training exercise?
W: There were other military people there, from Korea, Australia, Great Britain, but those were military attaches, and in their embassy attaché office. They had nothing to do with the Vietnamese training except to observe.

G: And they never entered into the advisory capacity?
W: No. Oh, I used to talk to them. They used to come over and see me and ask me about this, that and the other, because they had to get a certain amount of material to report to their home government.
They'd come over and ask questions, and I was always very frank with them. I'd lay it right on the line, tell them what we were doing or trying to do.

There's a lot of Americans that wanted to find fault with what went on in Vietnam, and one claim was that we were training the Vietnamese military improperly. But my orders were to organize, train, and equip the Vietnamese army, navy and air force. I had a certain number of navy personnel there, not many. A captain was their senior officer, comparable to an army colonel, of course. We had a major of the Marine Corps there, a good one, too. I think the senior air force adviser would have been a lieutenant colonel, maybe a colonel. The rest of them were army. We were always so short-handed. Of course, you say what we can see today and we couldn't see then, but I thought I saw a whole lot then that I'm not convinced that I didn't see. After say 1958 or 1959, I did not see a North Korean type invasion from North Vietnam, which I had seen in 1956 and 1957. I said to myself, "They're not going to do it."

G: How did you know? What changed your mind?

W: I don't know. I think it's because the Vietnamese were getting progressively stronger. We were making very good progress. I thought if the North Vietnamese came down they'd have a fight on their hands that they didn't want to take on. I believe that if they had come down in 1955 or 1956 they could walk in standing up. By 1958 or 1959 I thought it would be a terrible fight from start to finish. And I
wasn't sure that the North Vietnamese could handle it or wanted to handle it.

Later I was under the impression that if we and the coup had let Diem alone that there would never have been a war. I think that Diem would have been able to negotiate in such a way with Ho Chi Minh that they could settle differences. You see, Ho Chi Minh and Diem knew each other quite well, and Ho Chi Minh had offered Diem a job in his government when Ho Chi Minh first took over from the French, but Diem had turned it down. So they were not strangers. Diem knew that country up north very well and had lived there, had traveled there. He was not a North Vietnamese, his home was around Hue, which as you know is in Central. But he knew the North Vietnamese and spoke several of their dialects. He was a smart man, and I believe if they had not had a coup d'état and killed him there would not have been a war. In Diem's time, at least.

I think more so, that if they would have gone ahead and given me an adequate number of advisors—see, when we got down to the fighting troops I had advisors at division headquarters only. None at artillery, none at the regiments, nor in separate battalions and units like that, and then advisors with supply and logistics, I was woefully short. When it came to the navy, hell, I couldn't move, I didn't have near enough. I tried to put a couple of officers in the naval academy in 1955-56, and the French admiral in command of the French navy in Vietnam at that time, told me and told me in all seriousness, "General Williams, if you will take command of the
Williams -- I -- 79

Vietnamese forces, I'll back you up with anything that I possibly can with the French navy. But as long as you insist on the Vietnamese being in command and Americans merely being advisors, I'm going to fight you every step of the way until I'm shipped out of Vietnam. If you try to put one single advisor in the naval academy, I'll pull every French officer out of that academy within the hour after you do it." Well, he had me, because at the time the utmost that I could have put in that naval academy was two U.S. officers.

G: How did you explain his attitude?

W: Well, that's the way he thought; he just thought, by George—and I don't think he was too damn stupid either. He just thought we should take command as the French had done and not try to let the Vietnamese command their own navy—in other words, I think he thought we were just spinning our wheels, that we couldn't teach the Vietnamese. Just like a senior French army officer said, "These people won't fight." And foolishly I said, "They just whipped you." Well, that was a stupid thing to say. The French weren't whipped necessarily there. They were whipped in Paris, just like we were whipped in the United States. We weren't whipped in Vietnam. That is my humble opinion of it.

G: You gave me your reasons why you thought there was no longer a serious threat of invasion, say after 1958. Did you have a good intelligence about that sort of thing in those days?

W: No.

G: How good was our intelligence over there?
W: I could only say as far as MAAG was concerned it was nonexistent. I had no intelligence personnel. I had no way of getting any military intelligence about the North Vietnamese and little about the sects, other than Bao Dai or the Hoa Hao that I got from the Vietnamese themselves. I think the Vietnamese officers, their headquarters, gave me all the information they could get, but I had no means. And I got none from the United States; I got no reports from G-2 of the Army or G-2 of the Department of the Army or Defense Department, saying such-and-such a thing is happening in North Vietnam. I got nothing of that nature that I can recall.

Once I suggested to Diem that he get spies into North Vietnam. He said they had tried but with poor success.

G: So you depended more or less on Vietnamese sources for lack of anything else?

W: Yes, that's right.

G: When what we now call the insurgency in South Vietnam got started—and there is some argument about when you can date that exactly, but the late fifties seems to be a pretty general consensus—how good was your information on that, on the early beginnings of that?

W: The only information I got of that was when the Vietnamese military would report, "We had an attack at such-and-such a place." The embassy often said these reports were false. MAAG advisors said the reports were true.

G: Did you see these as communist-inspired or bandit-inspired or what?
W: I thought it was simply local, but I always figured that the hard-core was communist and directed from Hanoi?

G: You always thought that?

W: Yes. I never at any time thought it was local uprisings. I thought they were sending those people down, these hard-core people down, and they would go into these villages and intimidate the people. They could do that. They would take a man and string him up on a pole, cut off his head and lay it down at his feet, take his wife out and gut her and lay her down there by his head and let the pigs get on them, things like that. I know those things happened. If you want to intimidate a village, that's an awful good way to do it, and two or three men can come in the night and do it. They know where the chief or the top man in that village lives. They come in, they go into his hootch at night and pull him and his wife out, and in the morning they're there laying out there in the middle of the street.

G: Could you ever get hard evidence that people were infiltrated from the north?

W: Well, you say hard evidence, no. I never had anything that you could pull a man up and try him for, but I know one of the first times we had casualties there, it was out at Bien Hoa if I remember correctly. It was after supper and the Americans were in their dining room and they put up a little motion picture machine and looking at motion pictures. Suddenly some people appeared at the windows, local Vietnamese were already at the windows looking in, kids and people
there at that post looking through the windows at the picture show.

Some of these outlaws appeared and sprayed inside the room with automatic weapons. One of them appeared to throw a bomb or a grenade of some kind through a kitchen door. He was countered in that, because there were two screen doors about ten feet apart. He apparently didn’t know about the second screen door, and so the thing bounced back on him and they found his remains outside the next morning.

I happened to be in Bangkok that particular day that happened, but I got a message of this attack. I got over there as fast as an airplane could take me. I told Diem, “This is no good.” I don’t know what our casualties are. There’s three or four people wounded and I think one or two dead, but I’m not positive and it makes no difference now at this late date. Lord take care of their souls. But I said, “This won’t work. This case must be solved.” Later Lansdale told me, “The Vietnamese thought so much about this that they broke some of their security finding out who did this.” So those people, the best I could find up until now, came three days marches from the north. In other words, they left someplace in the north, and I never did know the details and I didn’t particularly care to, if I had known I couldn’t have remembered it anyway. They left a particular place in the north and they walked all night. Then they went into hiding during the day. Another guide picked them up. They were strangers, they didn’t know the country. Another guide would pick them up, walked them all night.
So for three nights they walked. They got to this place and then they botched their job, because the windows were too high so they couldn't shoot down at the seats. The people that were hurt were trying to get upstairs to get their weapons. By that time I'd told our people to always keep a weapon handy. Now, we weren't supposed to be armed. But I never went anywhere that I didn't have a .45. I said, "You can carry weapons without advertising it to the world, not even your Vietnamese compadre needs to know that you're carrying a .45. But for Christ's sakes, carry something!" These advisors weren't carrying them because they were sitting in their own dining room, they'd left their damn weapons upstairs. That's stupid. The reason some people don't survive is because they do things like that. But anyway, the people that were shot were going up the staircase.

The raiders killed a Vietnamese girl that lived there. She happened to be standing outside on a box or something watching the movie. They killed her. They didn't give a damn who they killed. [They found] the remains of one of them there. He had been killed by his own grenade. But that was the only hard evidence that I recall that someone had come down from the north. But of course I knew, or at least I believed, that these people were coming down and they would go to these places and they would intimidate these villagers and they would make certain recruits.

G: Was that the purpose of these terroristic acts in your own mind?
W: Yes. It was merely to disturb the people so that they would have no confidence in their government.

G: With a view toward--

W: Someday to overthrowing it maybe.

G: I see. Okay.

W: But in my mind it never was anything except communists. I didn't believe any of these local agricultural people wanting to rise up and overthrow the government. To me from the very first it was definitely communist inspired. I still think it was. And I think some of the things that came out to us from the United States was by people who had a very charitable view toward communism. I wouldn't say they were communists, but I would say that a lot of the things that came down to us or came to me I thought was instigated by someone who was pro-communist. I'm very serious about that; even after twenty-some odd years I still believe that with all my soul.

G: You said that our intelligence was no better than it should have been, I suppose. How good was the other side's intelligence as you discovered as time went on?

W: The Viet Cong?

G: Yes.

W: I think it must have been very good. I think it must have been very good, because they could pass themselves off as villagers. They could go anywhere in the country they wanted to anytime as there was free movement. I remember one U.S. Army War College class came out there on a visit and one of the students said to me later,
"Hell, you're living in a police state." I said, "Why do you say we're in a police state?" He said, "Well, from the airfield in to your headquarters there were two policemen on every block." Police walking. I said, "Sure, they're watching traffic. They know you're coming in. They want you to move and move without any congestion or anything else where you're going. Now for your information, I've talked to police officials in the United States and told them what the police strength was in this city and asked about the ratio of police to population. I've been told that there's no city in the United States that could work on a ratio of as few policemen per thousand people as they do right here in Saigon. This is not a police state." People could go anywhere. There wasn't any hold on them. This student had been given false information before he ever got to Vietnam.

G: A very free and easy atmosphere?
W: That's right, yes.
G: Did you ever have any indication that the Viet Cong had infiltrated higher headquarters, not necessarily yours, but others?
W: No. I never suspected it.
G: Well, I have to ask you to explain something then. I read an interview that you gave to the U.S. News & World Report--at least that is the credentials that they presented--and as I recall the interview was in 1964.
W: Well, I tell you, I sure wish I had a copy of that interview because several people have asked me for it and I have said, "I can't find that damn magazine. I used to have it around here."

G: Well, I'll give you my copy. I can get another one. The reason I ask you that is because they've got a quote there that says, and I'm quoting--well, I will in a minute--the VC infiltrated both ARVN and MAAG headquarters and then they quote you, "I knew that and I fought it," unquote.

W: Let me see if I can find that.

G: I don't have the page [number].

(Interuption)

G: You've just said that you may have said it in 1964 but you can't remember now why you would have said it.

W: No.

G: Okay. Well--

W: I know that they used to come in and insist on going over my walls and telephone and things like that with their electrical machines to see if there were any bugs in there or if the phones had been tapped. But, I didn't put a great deal of faith in that either. You know, it's just like anything like that can happen. They can do that and say your place is absolutely clean, tomorrow morning might not be clean at all.

G: Did they ever find anything?
No. If they did they never told me. Correction. A Vietnamese clerk in MAAG Finance office was arrested. Vietnamese police told us he was a Viet Cong agent.

Was there some point in the fifties when you became aware that what was going on in the countryside was not just isolated terror anymore, but a campaign of sorts had started against the government? In other words, these were not unrelated incidents but there was a pattern and it was being centrally directed.

I thought—well, now, against the government. Well now, we're talking about the Viet Cong raids?

Well, I thought all the time that was directed from Hanoi.

Okay. Did Washington ever give you any indication of what their estimate of the situation was at all? Any advice on what new measures should be taken to cope with the worsening situation, anything like that?

At this moment I can't remember of any. In any case I had no means, no troops, no police.

The reason I'm asking is that there was a national intelligence estimate that was done in the spring of 1959, which I came across, which predicted that the security forces—the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Forces—were not going to be able to cope with the terror in the countryside, that the ARVN would have to be used, and the Diem was losing his popularity. I'm wondering if you ever got such a report from Washington.
W: If I did I can't remember it.

G: Okay.

W: But a report like that would not be surprising to me at all, because I think every Tom, Dick and Harry that had ever crossed the Pacific Ocean suddenly became an expert on Asian affairs and was liable to get anything in print back in the United States about that part of the world.

G: Of course, this was a national intelligence estimate, it wasn't a State Department estimate or even just a CIA, it was the combined intelligence thinking of the whole Washington community. When I saw that I thought, well, this is serious. Obviously somebody in Washington thinks the situation is getting serious. I was wondering if they ever communicated it to you.

W: If they did I don't remember it. The embassy may have received it, however.

G: Okay. Despite the increase in terrorism, did you think still in 1959 and 1960 there was still sufficient cause for optimism about how it could possibly all turn out?

W: Yes. Yes. I was optimistic up until the day I left there in 1960. Since 1955 we had made great progress with the Vietnamese armed forces. Our advisors were good. They were doing top work.

G: That was the impression that I had garnered and I wanted to make sure it was the correct impression. But you also said in another place, I think it's in this other interview, that when you left in September that the situation had worsened in one respect, and that was the
relations between the embassy and President Diem. Is that an accurate statement?

W: Oh, yes. I would say that.

G: What was going on? What was the trouble there?

W: I don't know. I know that there was this friction—what I called friction—between the President and Mr. Durbrow. It didn't surprise me too much because there was always so many derogatory things being said at country team meetings about the President.

G: Such as what?

W: Oh, vulgar things in country team meetings where not only the country team members were present but maybe some staff officials from their various headquarters would be in there for different kinds of briefings and so forth. If derogatory things were said, I had the fear, and I believed very strongly, that those things could be repeated on the outside. Say that USOM might have a man at the meeting that's going to say something about fisheries or something like that. Maybe the Ambassador or one of the high-ranking individuals there would say, "Well, now, what do you think that little son-of-a-bitch is going to do about that?" Or someone might ask how can we embarrass the little bastard today.

G: What would prompt—

W: What would prompt that? I don't know. I don't know. Because I thought it was terrible and I objected to it and I objected to it strongly. I said to these individuals, maybe not at that instance, "You've got people in here that go outside and this man here has
something to do with fisheries and he goes back to his office and
says, 'I heard the Ambassador or so and so, maybe the USOM chief,
refer to President Diem as that little sawed-off son-of-a-bitch or
a dirty little bastard.' He says that because that gives him prestige;
he thinks because he's telling someone that he was in on such a con-
ference. Who he tells it to, whether it's his secretary, whether it's
another American or whether it's a French secretary or what, they're
going to repeat it. First thing you know, it's all over town that
so-and-so referred to the President as a son-of-a-bitch. Now what
good does that do anybody? It can do nothing but harm, nothing but
harm. It's nasty, it's shortsighted, it's non-professional."

G: You were out of sympathy with people who felt that way?
W: Absolutely.

G: Well, did this affect your relations with the country team or with
USOM?
W: It affected my relations with the country team no end.

G: How so?
W: Well, because most all sooner or later became hostile to me. Example:
when MAAG submitted a yearly budget, I would never get up and submit
the budget. I would always get one of my officers, in particular a
man that's dead now, General Lambert, to present the budget. Lambert
could get up and present the budget and [snaps fingers] they'd approve
it like that. I'd get up and present that budget and have to argue
and answer questions for three hours, just nit-picking. They knew
that President Diem put a good deal of faith in me and that he had a
very high regard for my opinions and took me in his confidence and he
didn't take these other people in his confidence. There must have been
jealousy there. I assume it was jealousy. I would certainly say it was
stupidity, because it didn't do the United States government any good to
have friction like that going on. I thought it was very bad, very bad.

G: Did you report on this development through channels?

W: I made no official report of it that I can remember of, by sitting down
and saying, "I want to report this, that and the other." But the Secre-
tary of the Army, Mr. Brucker, was thoroughly cognizant of it. I'm sure
General Taylor was aware of it. Admiral [Felix] Stump certainly knew it,
who was CINCPAC. Admiral [Harry D.] Felt certainly knew it. It wasn't
any secret in Southeast Asia. As a matter of fact, one time I was
bemoaning the fact to some U.S. army officer visitor, and he said, "Why,
you shouldn't worry at all. You should know about the friction that's
going on between MAAG and the Ambassador up in Japan. What you've got
down here amounts to nothing. If you want to get into it, just think
about the Chief of MAAG over in the Philippines and the Ambassador over
there. They're almost at fisticuffs. Hell, everyone does that." So,
that causes a person to think, well, maybe it's not so bad, but to me
it was very bad.

G: Now, I have looked at some Senate hearings that were done in the
summer of 1959, and then again there were some that were taken,
some testimony was taken in Saigon in December of 1959, and I think
this has to do with Colegrove, who was a reporter and reported some
very sensational findings and there were hearings and so on. The
testimony from Ambassador Durbrow and Mr. [Arthur Z.] Gardiner, I believe it was, is all very positive about the whole program, about President Diem and so on and so on. Not a harsh word.

W: Very positive, you say?

G: Very, yes. They praised the Vietnamese government and so on. It reads one way and what you're telling me reads another way. Can you reconcile that?

W: They couldn't afford to downgrade Diem and the Vietnamese in an open investigation. I was reading a draft that they had prepared up at the Military History Division, they sent down here a book that they're writing to get my opinion. They spoke about the friction between the American Ambassador and the Chief of MAAG and said both freely admitted that this friction and that Mr. [Leland] Barrows, who had been USOM chief before Mr. Gardiner, said yes, that it was simply terrible, that the friction that went on between those two men was just out of this world. That same history, that was a draft of a history they're writing, quotes General [John F.] Ruggles as remarking on it, so on and so forth. So there was no secret about it.

G: But it doesn't come out in the testimony before a Senate committee?

W: Probably the Senate had no knowledge of it and certainly Durbrow and Gardiner wouldn't bring it up. But I'll tell you what did come out there, which was very bad. The Senate sent for the Ambassador and Mr. Gardiner to come back to the United States to appear before the Mansfield Committee. Suddenly I got orders from the Department of the Army that I would come also, that same time. So I did. When we got
to Hawaii I think it was, Durbrow said--maybe it was Guam--to Gardiner and me, "Now we've got to get our stories lined up so it won't appear that there are any differences of opinion." Well, Gardiner didn't say anything, I didn't say anything. When we went in before the Mansfield Committee, the Ambassador sat down at the center of a table. I was over on the righthand side and Gardiner on his lefthand side, and the Ambassador and Gardiner had stacks and stacks of papers and books in front of them. I had a pocket notebook and a pencil, nothing else.

Well, as this committee hearing went on and went on, I kept moving further away because it was a massacre. Finally it got so that those senators would ask either the Ambassador or Gardiner something, and before they could answer they would ask them another question. And you know when they start seesawing a witness that way the witness is whipped. So I kept taking distance. Now, at last when they did question me, Mr. Mansfield started out by saying, "Now, General Williams, we didn't ask that you appear before this committee, but the Army decided, or the Pentagon decided that you should be present. So since you are here we'd like to ask you some questions." So he asked me some questions. Now I must say that maybe this was not very diplomatic, but several times during this couple of days these hearings had been going on, when they'd ask the Ambassador something or Gardiner something and they'd start fumbling with the papers to answer it, I would say, "I'll answer that question. It was such-and-such." And that was the answer, because
hell, I knew it from general knowledge and memory without having to--
in other words, if I had to shuffle through a batch of papers to get
an answer, I would be lost.

G: Has one of those questions whether they had ever cancelled one of
your programs?

W: I don't know. I don't remember. But anyway, Mansfield said, "We
didn't ask you to be here, but since you are we'd like to ask you
some questions." And they did ask questions. When they got through,
Mansfield and some of these other senators were very laudatory in
their remarks to me. I was surprised. There's where I got the
expression that I used later with the Vietnamese, I'm working myself
out of the job, because Mansfield said to me, "You're trying to work
yourself out of a job." I said, "Exactly. Just as soon as I get
done what I was told to do out there, I want to come back to the
United States, as I've been out there some time." Neither Durbrow
nor Gardiner could have been too happy with their experience before
Mansfield.

Well, anyway, now we're back in Vietnam. One day Mr. Thuan,
the secretary to the presidency, said to me, "What did you think
about the Mansfield Report?" I said, "I haven't seen it," and I
hadn't. He said, "Well, the embassy tells us to take it all with
a grain of salt. Said your treatment wasn't as good as it sounds."

[End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I]